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THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN 
INTERPRETING AND DEVELOPING HUMANITARIAN LAW 
DAVID WEISSBRODT* 
The four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977 generally lack authoritative mechanisms for 
interpretation.  Interpretation and application of these treaties are 
left principally to the judgment of the States parties to the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols1 as well as increasingly to the 
International Criminal Court and tribunals.  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) encourages States parties to 
comply with their obligations under humanitarian law; however,  
it is not an adjudicative body,2 and it rarely publishes its 
authoritative interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols.  Article 90 of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions authorizes the establishment of the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission.3  While 70 states have 
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1 See Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and 
the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 305 (2005) 
(“With regard to the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions more broadly, all 
contracting parties are required by Article 1 to respect the Conventions, but the 
only external enforcement mechanism in the treaty is Article 49 of the First 
Convention, which requires high contracting parties to enact penal legislation so 
as to prosecute grave breaches of the Conventions.”); Neil A.F. Popović, 
Commentary, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights, 8 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 77 (1995) (“Much of the responsibility for compliance 
with the Geneva Conventions and Protocols is left to the parties themselves, aided 
or cajoled by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).”).  The ICRC 
has also convened scholars from around the world to gather customary 
international law as to the content of humanitarian law.  For a collection of works 
written by an international assortment of scholars on customary international 
humanitarian law, see CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
2 See, e.g., Mary Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous 
Oversight in the Development of an International Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 621, 
641 (2003) (noting that the ICRC lacks adjudicative powers). 
3 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 90, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I] (authorizing the 
establishment of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission). 
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accepted the competence of the Commission, which has been ready 
for activities since Article 90 came into force in 1991, the parties to 
armed conflicts have yet to call upon it.4 
At the same time, eight human rights treaty bodies, thirty 
thematic mechanisms of the U.N. Human Rights Council (formerly 
Commission), and three regional human rights commissions and 
courts have been requested to respond to various situations 
involving humanitarian law violations.5  Some of these decision-
making institutions (such as the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights)6 
 
4 See Konstantin Meljnik & Stefan Weiss, Conference Report—30 Years 
Additional Protocols To The 1949 Geneva Conventions: Past, Present and Future, 18th 
Conference of the Legal Advisors to the German Army and of the Representatives 
of the German Red Cross, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1355, 1360 (2008) [hereinafter Conference 
Report on Protocol] (“[A]s yet no single application for investigation by the 
Commission has been filed.”). 
5 See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 2002/36, ¶ 13(a), in Report on Fifty-
Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 22, 2002) (expressing the 
Commission’s “grave concern over the continued occurrence of violations relating 
to the right to life highlighted in the report of the Special Rapporteur [on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions] as deserving special attention 
[including] . . . violations of the right to life during armed conflict”).  See also 
Philip Alston et al., The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special 
Procedures in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the “War on 
Terror,” 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 196–97 (2008) (“Finally, the recent study on 
customary international humanitarian law produced under the auspices of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that ‘[t]here is extensive 
State practice to the effect that human rights law must be applied during armed 
conflicts.’”).  The International Court of Justice also plays a role in interpreting 
and developing humanitarian law.  See generally GENTIAN ZYBERI, THE 
HUMANITARIAN FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO 
INTERPRETING AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
RULES AND PRINCIPLES 1 (2008) (analyzing in systematic detail the contribution and 
role of the ICJ in developing international human rights and humanitarian laws). 
6 Article 64 of the American Convention provides that any member state of 
the OAS may consult the Inter-American Court on the interpretation of the 
Convention or of other treaties on the protection of human rights in the American 
states.  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, 174, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1 (2003), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/general.html.  But see Las Palmeras v. 
Colombia, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 67, at 7-10 (Feb. 4, 2000) (“[The 
American Convention] has only given the Court competence to determine 
whether the acts or the norms of the States are compatible with the Convention 
itself, and not with the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”).  The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has thus far rejected the lex specialis application of humanitarian 
law on jurisdictional grounds, but continues to refer to and consider humanitarian 
law provisions.  The Commission continues to apply humanitarian law as lex 
specialis.  See Letter from Juan E. Méndez, President, Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, to Ref. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Mar. 13, 2002), 
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have interpreted and applied humanitarian law in their respective 
domains.7  Some treaty bodies (including the Human Rights 
Committee)8 have generally responded to requests referring to the 
Geneva Conventions using only their own treaty.9  Other 
mechanisms (such as the U.N. Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances) have deferred to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.10 
The International Criminal Court,11 the International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/guantanamo-2003.html (quoting the 
letter notifying the United States of the imposition of precautionary measures). 
7 See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 19th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Iraq, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.94 (Oct. 26, 1998) (recommending that “the State party raise the 
legal minimum age of voluntary enlistment into the armed forces in the light of 
international human rights and humanitarian law”); Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child, 34th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: 
Israel, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195 (Oct. 9, 2002) (“[W]ith reference to 
international humanitarian law, notably the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, that the State party fully comply 
with the rules of distinction (between civilians and combatants) and 
proportionality (of attacks that cause excessive harm to civilians).”). 
8 See generally Atkinson v. Canada, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights 
Comm., 55th Sess., No. 573/1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/573/1994 (1995) 
(citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention], 
Geneva Protocol I, and “the legal commentaries prepared by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross”); Julian v. New Zealand, Decision on Admissibility, 
Human Rights Comm., 59th Sess., No. 601/1994, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/601/1994 (1997) (citing Third Geneva Convention, Geneva 
Protocol I and “the legal commentaries prepared by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross”); T.W.M.B v. The Netherlands, Decision on Admissibility, 
Human Rights Comm., 43rd Sess., No. 403/1990, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/43/D/403/1990 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]). 
9 All three of the communications cited in the preceding footnote were ruled 
inadmissible. 
10 See Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.6 (Rev.3), 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues 
/disappear/members.htm#facts (“The Working Group does not deal with 
situations of international armed conflict, in view of the competence of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in such situations, as 
determined by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols of 1977.”). 
11 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (establishing the International 
Criminal Court).  
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International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“ICTY”),12 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),13 and several other 
international or mixed national/international tribunals have a role 
in establishing and interpreting international humanitarian law.  
Further, national courts have been asked to apply humanitarian 
law for some time, particularly in the context of the post-2001 “war 
on terror.”14  National military courts have consistently applied 
humanitarian law.  Some courts (e.g., in the United States) have 
refused to apply humanitarian law,15 while others’ invocation of it 
has demonstrated their reluctance to explore the contours of this 
relatively complex domain of international law.16 
For some legal issues, human rights mechanisms and national 
courts can use humanitarian law to interpret international human 
rights or national law.  For example, humanitarian law may be 
useful in assessing several issues such as whether a prisoner 
qualifies as a prisoner of war with the associated privileges,17 what 
 
12 See generally Statute of the International Tribunal, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter International Tribunal Statute] 
(establishing an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible 
for violations of international human rights law in former Yugoslavia). 
13 See generally Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing a tribunal “to prosecute persons 
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in Rwanda”). 
14 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (finding that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applicable). 
15 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining 
to apply the Geneva Conventions on the grounds that they are not self-executing) 
rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law 
of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 599, 605 n.25 (2008) (“The lower courts are divided on whether the Geneva 
Conventions are self-executing.”).  Compare United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 
at 4 n.4 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007) (finding the Geneva Conventions “generally 
viewed as self-executing treaties”), and United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 
541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (observing that the “Geneva Convention is [a] self-
executing treaty to which the United States is a signatory”), with Hamdi, 316 F.3d 
at 468 (observing that the Geneva Convention is not self-executing). 
16 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (invoking the Third 
Geneva Convention but declining to engage petitioner’s specific argument that his 
detention violated Article 5).  But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549–51 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (discussing petitioner’s Article 5 argument).  See also Hamdan, 548 U.S. 
at 567, 628–33 (offering only an abbreviated analysis to support its holding that 
Common Article 3 is applicable to the war against al-Qaeda). 
17 See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding 
that Noriega is a prisoner of war). 
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procedural protections are applicable to an “enemy combatant,”18 
and whether a killing19 or a detention is arbitrary20 because it 
violates humanitarian law. 
This article reviews more thoroughly the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) as a prelude for a broader 
review of other treaty bodies, thematic mechanisms, regional 
human rights courts or commissions, international criminal courts 
or tribunals, and national courts.  What lessons can be drawn about 
the competence of these institutions in developing humanitarian 
law?  To what extent are there divergences or commonalities in the 
interpretations given by these various institutions?  What 
conclusions can be drawn about the usefulness of humanitarian 
law in resolving various issues?  How are human rights bodies and 
courts shaping the contours of humanitarian law?  How has the 
“war on terror” and, perhaps, counter-terrorism changed the need 
for competent adjudicative mechanisms in the field of 
humanitarian law?  Should there be an authoritative and widely 
accepted treaty body to interpret the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols? 
The remainder of this article addresses the HRC’s 
interpretation of international humanitarian law.  It examines the 
Committee’s general approach to interpreting the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Civil and Political 
Covenant”), to addressing relevant issues of international law, and 
to specifically addressing the rules of international humanitarian 
law.  Parts I through III consider all relevant documents that the 
HRC has produced including its Decisions and Views, its General 
Comments, and its Concluding Observations.  Part IV synthesizes 
the methodology and approach taken by the Committee in its three 
realms.  Part V recommends that in order for the Committee to 
produce precedential material interpreting international 
humanitarian law, it must explicitly consider the Geneva 
Conventions and their Optional Protocols when individual 
submissions raise issues of international humanitarian law.  Under 
 
18 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 (holding that military tribunals must comply 
with Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva Conventions Common Article 
3). 
19 See Disabled Peoples’ Int’l v. United States, Case 9213 (United States), 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II.67, doc. 6 (1986). 
20 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Decision, Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba) (2002) reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002) (evaluating the 
legality to U.S. detentions in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba). 
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the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant, the 
ultimate findings must be limited to violations of the Covenant 
itself, but the Committee could provide useful and precedential 
analysis of international humanitarian obligations in reaching a 
finding of a Covenant violation. 
1. DECISIONS AND VIEWS 
Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,21 the HRC considers individual 
submissions alleging violations of rights protected by the Civil and 
Political Covenant.22  Because the Decisions and Views are fact-
specific and contain the most analysis of the Covenant, they 
provide, in theory, the best possibility of establishing international 
humanitarian law precedent.  This Part considers how the 
Committee has addressed issues of international humanitarian 
law, by first considering the Committee’s general approach to 
relevant international instruments and then examining 
international humanitarian issues raised before the Committee.  
This Part finds that the Committee has proven extremely reluctant 
to address any international instrument besides the Civil and 
Political Covenant. 
1.1. General Approach to Other International Instruments 
This section first considers the development of the HRC’s 
jurisprudence as it addressed individual complaints.  Early 
complaints and the resulting decisions established certain 
parameters for the Decisions and Views: the Committee was 
extremely reluctant to step beyond the Civil and Political 
Covenant.  This section then considers more recent decisions in 
which the Committee has begun to consider other relevant 
international instruments explicitly in its Decisions and Views. 
 
21 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (providing 
an individual complaint mechanism for the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). 
22 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant] (providing protection to 
individual civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, and the right to live). 
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1.1.1. Jurisprudential Development 
The Optional Protocol creates a complaint mechanism for 
“individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any rights set 
forth in the [Civil and Political] Covenant.”23  The HRC takes this 
mandate literally and limits its opinions to addressing provisions 
of the Civil and Political Covenant.  Originally, the Committee took 
the position that to determine the rights protected by the 
Covenant, it would look to the “ordinary meaning of each 
element,” the travaux preparatoires of the Covenant,24 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.25 
K. L. v. Denmark was the first communication to raise claims of 
violations of international instruments beyond the Civil and 
Political Covenant.26  Alongside alleged violations of the Civil and 
Political Covenant, the author alleged violations of “a number of 
international instruments.”27  The HRC stated: 
In accordance with article 1 of the Optional Protocol, the 
Human Rights Committee has only examined the author’s 
claims insofar as they are alleged to reveal breaches by the 
 
23 Optional Protocol, supra note 21. 
24 See Marc J. Bossuyt, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 89 (Martinus Nijhoft 
Publishers 1987) (“[I]t was proposed, unsuccessfully, that in order to [sic] any 
possible misinterpretation of the words ‘international law,’ there should be in 
addition to these words a reference to the ‘principles of the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”).  A proposed amendment to Article 46 
providing that the Covenant shall not “be interpreted in such a way as to impair 
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide” 
was withdrawn in light of the political consequences of its potential rejection.  Id. 
at 731-32.  While it does not appear that the Commission considered the inclusion 
of explicit references to the Geneva Conventions or “humanitarian law,” it did 
consider referencing “lawful acts of war” as a source of permissible derogations.  
Id. at 92.  Such references, however, were either rejected or not voted on.  Id.  This 
reticence to include a reference to war is attributable to the sentiment among 
drafters that “the covenant should not envisage, even by implication, the 
possibility of war, as the United Nations was established with the object of 
preventing war.”  Id. at 86. 
25 See J.B. v. Canada, Decision, Human Rights Comm., 28th Sess., No. 
118/1982, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) (1986) (interpreting the scope 
of Article 22 by looking to the ordinary meaning in its context, the travaux 
preparatoires of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights). 
26 K.L. v. Denmark, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 9th 
Sess., No. 59/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 24-25 (1980). 
27 Id. 
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State party of the provisions of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee has no 
competence to examine alleged violations of other international 
instruments.28 
As the author put forth rather implausible claims related to 
taxation and mental illness, the HRC found the communication 
inadmissible on the theory that the author did not substantiate his 
allegations.29  In another early ruling, when an author cited 
International Labour Organization (ILO) jurisprudence in support 
of establishing a right to strike under the Civil and Political 
Covenant, the HRC limited the ILO’s interpretation by stating, 
“[E]ach international treaty, including the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, has a life of its own and must be 
interpreted in a fair and just manner, if so provided, by the body 
entrusted with the monitoring of its provisions.”30  The Committee 
then conducted an original analysis, concluding that the Covenant 
does not protect a right to strike.31  Following these cases, the HRC 
has not considered claims of violations of other international 
instruments even though communications decided through the 
mid-1990s frequently alleged such violations.32  The only apparent 
 
28 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
29 Id. 
30 J.B. v. Canada, Decision, Human Rights Comm., 28th Sess., No. 118/1982, 
¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) (1986). 
31 Id. ¶¶ 6.3–6.4. 
32 See K.J.L v. Finland, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 
49th Sess., No. 544/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/544/1993 (1993) (responding 
only to the claim under the Civil and Political Covenant and not considering a 
claimed violation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights); J.P.K. v. The Netherlands, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights 
Comm., 43d Sess., No. 401/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/401/1990 (1991) 
(ignoring a long list of alleged violations of various international instruments and 
finding no violation of the Civil and Political Covenant); T.W.M.B. v. The 
Netherlands, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 49th Sess., No. 
403/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/403/1990 (1991) (finding again that there 
was no violation of the Civil and Political Covenant); C.B.D. v. The Netherlands, 
Decision, Human Rights Comm., 45th Sess., No. 394/1990, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/45/D/394/1990 (1992) (finding no violation of the Civil and Political 
Covenant as well); Blom v. Sweden, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights 
Comm., No. 191/1985, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) (1988) 
(responding to claims that the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education of 1960 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights were violated by stating the HRC “could only consider a 
communication in so far as it concerned an alleged breach of the provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”). 
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exception occurred in A.M. v. Denmark, where the author claimed 
to be a victim of breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.33  The Committee correlated the protected rights in the 
Universal Declaration to the corresponding rights in the Civil and 
Political Covenant and proceeded as though the author had 
alleged violations of the Covenant.34  This exception, however, is 
likely because the Covenant is premised explicitly on the Universal 
Declaration.35 
The Committee similarly disregards claims of violations of 
customary international law.36  In a singular departure, however, 
the HRC addressed customary international law in A. v. Australia.37  
The author, a citizen of Cambodia, claimed he was detained by 
Australia in violation of Article 9 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant and in contravention of “international treaty law and 
customary international law,” citing38 the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.39  Australia responded that the Committee 
lacked competence to adjudicate claims premised on customary 
 
33 See A.M. v. Denmark, Decision, Human Rights Comm., No. R.26/121, ¶ 
3.2, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982) (“In particular he claims to be a 
victim of breaches by Denmark of articles 5, 7 and 10 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as regards the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment 
or punishment, the right to equality before the law and the right to a fair trial.”). 
34 Id. 
35 See J.B. v. Canada, Decision, Human Rights Comm., 28th Sess., No. 
118/1982, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) (1986) (exemplifying how the 
Covenant is premised on the Universal Declaration). 
36 See Williams v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights Comm., 61st Sess., No. 
609/1995, ¶ 3.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 (1997) (disregarding an 
alleged breach of customary international law); Julian v. New Zealand, Decision, 
Human Rights Comm., 59th Sess., No. 601/1994, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/601/1994 (1997) (disregarding an alleged violation of 
international law); Bordes v. France, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights 
Comm., 57th Sess., No. 645/1995, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 
(1996) (disregarding the complaint that President Chirac’s plans to conduct a 
series of underground nuclear tests was a “clear violation of international law”); 
Nahlik v. Austria, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 57th Sess., 
No. 608/1995, ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/608/1995 (1996) (disregarding an 
alleged violation of “the general principle of equal treatment under labor law”). 
37 See generally A v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 59th Sess., No. 
560/1993, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997) (noting that it cannot 
find “any support for the contention that there is a rule of customary international 
law” in the context laid out in the complaint). 
38 Id. ¶ 3.1. 
8 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter Refugees Convention]. 
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international law or other international instruments.40  The author 
maintained that other international instruments were relevant to 
the interpretation of the Civil and Political Covenant.41  Australia 
responded that customary international law and other instruments 
could not be imported into the Covenant.42  The Committee ruled 
that it was not per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting 
asylum, and that it could not “find any support for the contention 
that there is a rule of customary international law which would 
render all such detention arbitrary.”43  While the Committee 
provided no analysis, this statement stands as the HRC’s only 
pronouncement on the applicability of customary international law 
to individual complaints under the Optional Protocol.  Notably, the 
HRC bypassed the parties’ contentions on whether it was 
competent to consider customary international law and instead 
stated that no such law covered the author’s claim.  The 
implication, therefore, is that the Committee must have considered 
customary international law in order to reach its decision. 
On several occasions, the HRC has addressed potential overlap 
between rights protected by the Civil and Political Covenant and 
by other international instruments.  According to the Committee, 
the provisions of the Covenant apply “even if a particular subject-
matter is referred to or covered in other international instruments. . 
. .”44  In practice, even if there is overlap between international 
instruments, the Committee considers the allegations under its 
 
40 See A v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 59th Sess., No. 560/1993, 
¶ 4.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D0560/1993 (1997) (“The State party argues that the 
Committee is competent only to determine whether there have been breaches of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant; it is not permissible to rely on 
customary international law or other international instruments as the basis of a 
claim.”). 
41 Id. ¶ 5.3. 
42 Id. ¶ 7.7. 
43 Id. ¶ 9.3. 
44 See Brooks v. The Netherlands, Views, Human Rights Comm., 42d Sess., 
No. 172/1984, ¶ 12.1, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/42/40) (1987) (“The Committee 
is of the view that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would 
still apply even if a particular subject-matter is referred to or covered in other 
international instruments. . . .”).  See also Vos v. The Netherlands, Views, Human 
Rights Comm., 44th Sess., ¶ 11.2, No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/44/40) (1989) (detailing further how the provisions of the Covenant apply); 
Danning v. The Netherlands, Views, Human Rights Comm., 42d Sess., No. 
180/1984, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/42/40) (1987) (explaining how the 
provisions of the Civil and Political Covenant apply even if there are other 
applicable international instruments). 
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own jurisprudence.45  Indeed, the Committee resolves differences 
between its jurisprudence and other bodies’ jurisprudence in favor 
of its own case law.46  As a result, the author must invoke a 
substantive right of the Covenant for the HRC to consider the 
communication.47 
The issue of overlap also arises when an author has previously 
submitted a complaint to the European Commission of Human 
Rights.  The Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant 
precludes the HRC from considering a complaint if “the same 
matter” is being examined “under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement. . . .”48  In the event of 
submission to both bodies, the HRC determines whether the right 
protected by the Civil and Political Covenant is sufficiently similar 
to a right protected by the European Convention so as to constitute 
“the same matter.”  The HRC has found Articles 14 and 17 of the 
Civil and Political Covenant to be sufficiently proximate to Articles 
6, 8, and 14 of the European Convention,49 and Article 22(1) of the 
 
45 See, e.g., Danning, No. 180/1984, ¶ 6.3 (stating that even if the protected 
right overlaps with another instrument, the Committee must determine whether 
the facts indicate a breach under the Civil and Political Covenant). 
46 See Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm., 63d 
Sess., No. 672/1995, ¶¶ 3.1, 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/672/1995 (1998) (citing 
its own case law favorably against a claim citing Jamaican law and the European 
Court of Human Rights). 
47 See Hoofdman v. The Netherlands, Views, Human Rights Comm., 64th 
Sess., No. 602/1994, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/602/1994 (1998) (“The 
Committee recalled that, whereas authors must invoke the substantive rights 
contained in the Covenant, they were not required, for purposes of the Optional 
Protocol, necessarily to do so by reference to specific articles of the Covenant.”). 
48 See Optional Protocol, supra note 21, art. 5(2)(a) (“The Committee shall not 
consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that . . . 
the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. . . .”). 
49 See Mahabir v. Austria, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 
82d Sess., No. 944/2000, ¶ 8.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/944/2000 (2004) 
(showing how the various articles are very similar to each other); Petersen v. 
Germany, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., No. 
1115/2002, ¶¶ 6.3, 6.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1115/2002 (2004) (illustrating 
the similarities between articles 14 and 17 of the Civil and Political Covenant to 
articles 6, 8, and 14 of the European Convention); Rogl v. Germany, Decision on 
Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 70th Sess., No. 808/1998, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/808/1998 (2000) (showing the similarities between articles 14 and 
17 of the Civil and Political Covenant to articles 6, 8, and 14 of the European 
Convention).  But see Lederbauer v. Austria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 90th 
Sess., No. 1454/2006, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1454/2006 (2007) (finding 
that Article 14 of the Civil and Political Covenant differs enough in scope and 
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Civil and Political Covenant to be proximate to Article 11(1) of the 
European Convention.50  In contrast, the HRC has found that 
Article 26 of the Civil and Political Covenant is broader and 
provides greater protection than Article 14 of the European 
Convention.51 
In many communications, rather than allege violations of other 
international instruments, authors cite those instruments as 
support for an alleged violation of the Civil and Political Covenant.  
Like the alleged direct violations, the HRC generally does not 
discuss the other international standards in these situations.  In 
cases alleging violations of the Covenant that cite to other 
international instruments where the HRC finds no violation, the 
Committee does not refer to the other sources cited.52  Similarly, in 
the large majority of communications where the author supports 
an alleged violation of the Covenant by reference to other 
international or foreign instruments and the Committee finds a 
 
jurisprudence from Article 6 of the European Convention to not constitute “the 
same matter”). 
50 See Wallmann v. Austria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., No. 
1002/2001, ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1002/2001 (2004) (showing how 
these articles are similar). 
51 See Mahabir, No. 944/2000, ¶ 8.5 (showing how, in regards to these 
articles, the Political Covenant is more protective than the European Convention); 
Althammer v. Austria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., No. 998/2001, ¶ 
8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 (2003) (“The Committee on earlier 
occasions has already decided that the independent right to equality and non-
discrimination embedded in article 26 of the Covenant provides a greater 
protection than the accessory right to non-discrimination contained in article 14 of 
the European Convention.”).  But see Irschik v. Austria, Decision on Admissibility, 
Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., No. 990/2001, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/990/2001 (2004) (finding that property rights protected under 
Article 26 of the Civil and Political Covenant are similarly protected by Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention). 
52 See Queenan v. Canada, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 
84th Sess., No. 1379/2005, ¶ 3.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1379/2005 (2005) 
(citing as support the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 
annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); Karawa v. 
Australia, Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 84th Sess., No. 
1127/2002, ¶ 3.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1127/2002 (2005) (referring to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]); Celal v. Greece, 
Decision on Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 82d Sess., No. 1235/2003, ¶ 3.2, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1235/2003 (2004) (citing the Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Eighth Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 
1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112 [hereinafter Basic Principles] and 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights). 
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violation, the Committee performs its analysis based solely on the 
Civil and Political Covenant.53  State parties also cite international 
instruments as support for their position, which the Committee 
similarly tends not to acknowledge.54 
1.1.2. More Recent Utilization of International Instruments 
Despite its apparent reluctance to do so, the Committee has on 
occasion referenced various international instruments.  Since 2003, 
the Committee has referenced such instruments with growing 
frequency, although it still remains an unusual occurrence. 
The Committee first referenced another international 
instrument as support for its ruling in Mukong v. Cameroon, in 
which it sua sponte cited the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (“Standard Minimum Rules”) as evidence 
of a violation of Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant.55  This 
opinion led to a string of claims involving inhuman detention 
conditions citing the same UN document as support.56  The 
 
53 See Sathasivam v. Sri Lanka, Views, Human Rights Comm., 93d Sess., No. 
1436/2005, ¶¶ 3.6, 3.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1436/2005 (2008) (finding a 
violation of the Covenant based on its own jurisprudence, although the author 
cited as support the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, and the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. 
GAOR. 43d Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988) 
[hereinafter Detention Principles]); Alzery v. Sweden, Views, Human Rights 
Comm., 88th Sess., No. 1416/2005, ¶¶ 4.23, 4.26-4.27, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006) (encouraging the Committee to follow 
approaches taken by the Committee Against Torture and the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe and citing Refugees Convention, supra note 
39). 
54 See, e.g., Ahani v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., No. 
1051/2002, ¶ 4.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (2004) (citing as support 
the European Convention, supra note 52). 
55 See Mukong v. Cameroon, Views, Human Rights Comm., 51st Sess., No. 
458/1991, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994) (“[I]n accordance 
with Rules 10, 12, 17, 19 and 20 of the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners . . . , minimum floor space and cubic content of air for each 
prisoner, adequate sanitary facilities, clothing which shall be in no manner 
degrading or humiliating, provision of a separate bed, and provision of food of 
nutritional value adequate for health and strength . . . [are] minimum 
requirements which the Committee considers should always be observed.”); 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF/611, Annex I A (1955) [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules] 
(providing a minimum standard of care). 
56 See Siewpersaud v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm., 
81st Sess., No. 938/2000, ¶ 3.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/938/2000 (2004) (noting 
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Committee, while finding violations in these cases, generally has 
not referred to the UN document.57  The Committee did cite the 
 
the string of claims on the inhuman detention conditions); Lobban v. Jamaica, 
Views, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., No. 797/1998, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998 (2004) (“The author alleges that he was locked up in 
his cell for up to 23 hours a day, that no mattress or bedding were provided, that 
no integral sanitation existed . . . .“); Francis v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, 
Human Rights Comm., 75th Sess., No. 899/1999, ¶ 3.5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/75/D/899/1999 (2002) (alleging poor detention conditions); R.S. v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm., 74th Sess., No. 684/1996, ¶ 
3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/684/1996 (2002) (alleging “lack of psychiatric 
care” under the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners); 
Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views,  Human Rights Comm., 77th Sess., No. 
908/2000, ¶ 3.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000 (1999) (“The author claims 
that the inadequate conditions of confinement during his five years on death row 
constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment . . . .“); Finn v. Jamaica, Views, 
Human Rights Comm., 63d Sess., No. 617/1995, ¶¶ 3.2-3.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/63/D/617/1995 (1998) (complaining that abusive language and threats 
were made upon arrest, and that conditions in the prison were unsanitary because 
of a lack of bedding, a lack of soap and toilet paper, poor food and drink quality, 
little ventilation and a lack of  medical treatment); Shaw v. Jamaica, Views, 
Human Rights Comm., 62d Sess., No. 704/1996, ¶ 5.5 U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996 (1998) (citing Resolution 1996/15 of the U.N. Economic 
and Social Council on “Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those 
facing the Death Penalty”); Deidrick v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights Comm., 
62d Sess., No. 619/1995, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/619/1995 (1998) 
(“Counsel concludes that fundamental and basic requirements of the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners have not been met 
during the author’s detention at St. Catherine District Prison . . . .”). 
57 See, e.g., Finn v. Jamaica, No. 617/1995, ¶ 9.2 (“Consequently, the 
Committee finds that in the circumstances where the State party has not provided 
any evidence in respect of the investigation it alleges to have carried out, due 
weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Accordingly, the Committee 
finds that there has been a violation of articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant.”); Shaw, No. 704/1996, ¶ 7.1 (concluding that “these conditions 
amount to a violation of articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant” without 
mentioning the Standard Minimum Rules); Deidrick, No. 619/1995, ¶ 9.3 (failing 
to make a decision with regard to alleged violations under the Standard 
Minimum Rules and mentioning only that “[i]n the committee’s opinion . . . [i]t 
finds that holding a prisoner in such conditions of detention constitutes inhuman 
treatment in violation of article 10, paragraph 1, and of article 7” of the Civil and 
Political Covenant). 
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UN document in one recent case58 and in another instance noted 
that it considers these standards relevant.59 
Most notably, considering the issue of enforced disappearance, 
the Committee sua sponte referenced the definition provided by 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
linked it to Articles 6, 7, 9, and 10 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant.60  Since first referencing the ICC’s definition, the 
Committee has consistently cited it for issues of enforced 
disappearance.61  More recently, the Committee also has cited sua 
 
58 See Benhadj v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 90th Sess., No. 
1173/2003, ¶ 8.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (2007) (“The Committee 
reiterates that persons deprived of their liberty may not be subjected to any 
hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty; 
they must be treated in accordance with, inter alia, the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners.”). 
59 See Baban v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., No. 
1014/2001, Notes ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (2003) (“The authors 
observe Third Committee of the General Assembly made express reference to the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957) when dealing in 
1958 with article 10 in draft.  The Committee has considered these Rules relevant 
to article 10 in both its General Comment 21 and in its consideration of States 
parties’ periodic reports under the Covenant.”). 
60 See Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Views, Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., No. 
950/2000, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 (2003) (referencing the 
definition provided by the Rome Statute); Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (demonstrating how the 
definition of enforced disappearance provided by the Rome Statute links to 
Articles 6, 7, 9, and 10 of the Civil and Political Covenant). 
61 See Sharma v. Nepal, Views, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., No. 
1469/2006, ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006 (2008) (“As to the alleged 
disappearance of the author’s husband, the Committee recalls the definition of 
enforced disappearance in article 7, paragraph 2(i), of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court . . . .”); El Hassy v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Views, 
Human Rights Comm., 91st Sess., No. 1422/2005, ¶ 6.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005 (2007) (“As to the alleged disappearance of the 
author’s brother, the Committee recalls the definition of enforced disappearance 
in article 7, paragraph 2(i), of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. . .”); Mohammed El Alwani v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Views, Human 
Rights Comm., 90th Sess., No. 1295/2004, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004 (2007) (“The Committee recalls the definition of 
enforced disappearance in article 7, paragraph 2(i), of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court . . . .”); Grioua v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights 
Comm, 90th Sess., No. 1327/2004, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1327/2004 
(2007) (“The Committee recalls the definition of enforced disappearance in article 
7, paragraph 2 (i), of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . . .”); 
Kimouche v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 90th Sess., No. 1328/2004, ¶ 
7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (2007) (“The Committee recalls the 
definition of enforced disappearance in article 7, paragraph 2 (i), of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court . . . .”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1200 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
 
sponte the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance62 and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.63 
In its Ninety-Fourth Session, for the first time, the HRC 
explicitly incorporated an author’s citation to another international 
instrument as support for finding a violation of the Civil and 
Political Covenant.  In the complaint of Madoui v. Algeria, the 
author cited the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, and the Committee used it as support in 
finding a violation of Article 16.64 
In Faure v. Australia, the Committee had to determine the 
meaning of “forced or compulsory labor” under Article 8.65  
Responding to both parties’ citations to International Labour 
Organization (ILO) instruments, the Committee stated:  “While the 
definitions of the relevant ILO instruments may be of assistance in 
elucidating the meaning of the terms, it ultimately falls to the 
Committee to elaborate the indicia of prohibited conduct.”66  
Without further reference to the ILO instruments, the Committee 
then performed a detailed analysis of the specific conduct 
 
62 See generally Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Feb. 12, 1993) 
(declaring forced disappearances an offense to human dignity, prohibiting any 
nation from practicing, permitting or tolerating forced disappearances and 
declaring violations to be criminal). 
63 See, e.g., Grioua, No. 1327/2004, ¶ 7.8 (citing article 1, paragraph 2, of the 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and 
article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance to establish the illegal nature of enforce disappearances); 
Kimouche, No. 1328/2004, ¶ 7.8 (citing the same).  See generally International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. 
Res. 61/177, U.N.Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007) (asserting the illegality of 
enforced disappearances, defining the term, establishing measures to hold 
perpetrators criminally responsible and who should be held responsible, among 
other things). 
64 Madoui v. Algeria, Views, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., No. 
1495/2006, ¶ 3.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1495/2006 (2008) (“As to article 16, 
the author believes that her son’s forced disappearance is inherently a denial of 
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. She cites the 18 
December 1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.”). 
65 See Faure v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 85th Sess., No. 
1036/2001, ¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1036/2001 (2005) (“The Committee 
notes, moreover, that article 8, paragraph 3(c)(iv), of the Covenant exempts from 
the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ such work or service forming part of 
normal civil obligations.”). 
66 Id. 
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prohibited by the Civil and Political Covenant.67  Therefore, while 
the Committee did not explicitly base its analysis on ILO 
instruments, it acknowledged that such instruments can illuminate 
Civil and Political Covenant protections. 
In one complaint, the Committee cited sua sponte the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees as support in finding 
violations of Articles 17, 23, and 24.68 
In a complex complaint considered during its Ninety-Fourth 
Session, the Committee had to confront an apparent contradiction 
between a UN Security Council Resolution and rights protected by 
the Civil and Political Covenant.69  Essentially, the authors of the 
complaint alleged that Belgium placed their names prematurely on 
a list pursuant to a Security Council resolution aimed at restricting 
activities of people associated with terrorism.70  In the submission, 
the authors and Belgium engaged in a back-and-forth debate over 
international obligations.  The authors claimed that a state could 
only avoid its duties under the Civil and Political Covenant if there 
were a public emergency, and that the general danger of terrorism 
did not meet Article 4’s public emergency standard so as to allow 
Belgium to violate their rights.71  They claimed that because 
Belgium acted pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution and 
in contradiction of the Civil and Political Covenant, the Security 
Council resolution violated peremptory norms of international law 
established by the Civil and Political Covenant, and Belgium 
should have adhered to the Civil and Political Covenant.72  
Belgium responded that the HRC had no jurisdiction to consider 
 
67 Id. 
68 See El Dernawi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Views, Human Rights Comm., 
90th Sess., No. 1143/2002, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1143/2002 (2007) 
(recognizing that the State’s action was the sole barrier preventing the author 
from reuniting with his family in Switzerland, and that “the author . . . as a person 
granted refugee status under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, 
cannot reasonably be expected to return to his country”).  See generally Refugees 
Convention, supra note 39 (establishing parameters for the just treatment of 
refugees). 
69 See Sayadi v. Belgium, Views, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., No. 
1472/2006, ¶ 10.13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008) (“[E]ven though 
the State party is not competent to remove the authors’ names from the United 
Nations and European lists, it is responsible for the presence of the authors’ 
names on those lists.”). 
70 Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.3. 
71 Id. ¶¶ 3.13, 5.8. 
72 Id. ¶ 5.7. 
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the validity of the Security Council resolution.73  It further argued 
that it was required to abide by the UN Charter, that it had no 
responsibility for how the Security Council acted, and that it had to 
act pursuant to a Charter obligation rather than comply with a 
“lower-ranking obligation that runs counter to the Charter.”74 
The case was contentious:  the HRC issued a majority decision 
along with more dissenting opinions than were filed in any 
previous decision.  The majority view first stated: 
While the Committee could not consider alleged violations 
of other instruments such as the Charter of the United 
Nations, or allegations that challenged United Nations rules 
concerning the fight against terrorism, the Committee was 
competent to admit a communication alleging that a State 
party had violated rights set forth in the Covenant, 
regardless of the source of the obligations implemented by 
the State party.75 
The Committee went on to state that it was “competent to 
consider the compatibility with the Covenant of the national 
measures taken to implement” a Security Council resolution.76  
Finding Belgium in violation of Articles 12 and 17, the Committee 
reaffirmed its obligation to act as a guarantor of rights protected by 
the Covenant.77  The large amount of individual dissents varied 
over multiple procedural and substantive issues.  This case, 
presented against a complex backdrop of international obligations 
and substantive issues, demonstrates that the HRC only tolerates 
derogations from the Civil and Political Covenant when they are 
taken pursuant to Article 4 of the Covenant. 
1.2. International Humanitarian Law 
The vast majority of individual communications submitted to 
the HRC do not arise from situations of armed conflict or declared 
states of emergency.  As a result, most decisions are not 
immediately useful in determining the Committee’s approach to 
issues of international humanitarian law.  Nonetheless, there are 
 
73 Id. ¶ 6.1. 
74 Id. ¶¶ 6.3, 8.1. 
75 Id. ¶ 7.2. 
76 Id. ¶ 10.6. 
77 Id. 
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some decisions that may indicate the extent to which the 
Committee would address allegations of such violations. 
The Committee has considered some individual 
communications arising from situations resembling armed conflict.  
In a string of cases early in the Committee’s jurisprudence, 
Uruguay replied to alleged Covenant violations by claiming that it 
had only taken necessary and prompt security measures.78  The 
Committee rejected the Uruguayan government’s claims, stating 
that Article 4 of the Covenant only allowed derogations under 
strictly defined circumstances and that some rights could never be 
derogated.79  The HRC similarly rejected arguments by Colombia 
that it was necessary to suspend certain rights during “the 
existence of a state of siege in all the national territory” due to 
violent narcotics trafficking.80  When South Korea claimed it 
needed to restrict its citizens’ rights to defend against possible 
North Korean intrusions, the Committee replied that general 
national security threats were insufficient to suspend the 
 
78 See Silva v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm., ¶ 8.2, No. 34/1978, 
12th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1981) (“[T]he government of Uruguay has 
made reference to an emergency situation in the country which was legally 
acknowledged in a number of ‘Institutional Acts.’”); Sala de Touron v. Uruguay, 
Views, Human Rights Comm., 12th Sess., ¶ 8, No. 32/1978, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (“The Government has referred to provisions of 
Uruguayan law, including the ‘prompt security measures,’” to justify its acts 
under the Covenant); Weisz v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm., 11th 
Sess., ¶ 8 No. 28/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (deciding a case in which 
Uruguay claimed that an arrestee was detained not for “his political beliefs or 
ideas or trade-union membership, but for having participated directly in 
subversive activities.”); Lanza de Netto v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights 
Comm., 9th Sess., No. 8/1977, at 45, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (deciding a 
case in which Uruguay claimed that the detainees were arrested “under the 
prompt security measures” and charged in military court “with the offense of 
‘subversive association’”). 
79 See Silva, No. 34/1978, ¶ 8.3 (“A] state, by merely invoking the existence of 
exceptional circumstances, cannot evade the obligations, which it has undertaken 
by ratifying the Covenant.”); Sala de Touron, No. 32/1978, ¶ 10 (“[T]he 
government has not made any submissions of fact or law to justify such 
derogation.”); Weisz, No. 28/1978, ¶ 8 (detailing how arrestee was detained not 
for “his political beliefs or ideas or trade-union membership, but for having 
participated directly in subversive activities.”); Lanza de Netto, No. 8/1977, ¶ 8 
(noting that detainees were arrested “under the prompt security measures” and 
charged in military court “with the offense of ‘subversive association.’”). 
80 Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, Decision on 
Admissibility, Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess., No. R.11/45, ¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982). 
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Covenant’s protections.81  The Committee has continued to 
maintain that a state cannot invoke national security to avoid the 
Committee’s scrutiny.82 
The HRC also has clarified that the Article 1 statement, 
“individuals subject to [a State party’s] jurisdiction,” refers “not to 
the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the 
relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a 
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever 
they occurred.”83  Consequently, the State party can be held liable 
for acts committed by its agents within another country’s 
territory.84 
Therefore, in the situations most nearly approximating armed 
conflict, the HRC has firmly applied and upheld the Covenant’s 
protections. 
1.3. Summary 
The Decisions and Views of the Committee, rendered in 
response to individual complaints under the Optional Protocol to 
the Civil and Political Covenant, present varied, and sometimes 
contradictory, responses.  On the one hand, the Committee has 
remained fiercely loyal to its duty to consider only complaints 
alleging a violation of the Civil and Political Covenant.  On the 
other hand, the Committee has slowly changed its approach, and 
now appears more willing to consider and utilize other 
international instruments when interpreting protections offered by 
the Covenant. 
It appears that the Committee would not directly consider a 
claim under international humanitarian law unless that claim was 
couched in the protections offered by specific articles of the Civil 
and Political Covenant.  While an individual communication could 
 
81 See Park v. Republic of Korea, Views, Human Rights Comm., 64th Sess., 
No. 628/1995, ¶¶ 8.2, 10.3-10.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (1998) 
(“[T]he State party has not made the declaration under article 4(3) of the Covenant 
that a public emergency existed and that it derogated certain Covenant rights on 
this basis.”). 
82 See Tsarjov v. Estonia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 91st Sess., No. 
1223/2003, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1223/2003 (2007) (“[T]he invocation 
of national security on the part of a State party does not, ipso facto, remove an 
issue wholly from the Committee’s scrutiny. . . .”). 
83 Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Views, Human Rights Comm., 13th 
Sess., No. 56/1979, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984). 
84 Id. ¶ 10.3. 
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cite international humanitarian law to support an alleged violation 
of a Covenant right, the Committee’s reluctance to incorporate 
other international instruments explicitly into its decisions 
suggests that it would not recognize any violation of the Geneva 
Conventions.  At best, the HRC may receive communications citing 
the Geneva Conventions as support for violations of the Civil and 
Political Covenant, but it would almost assuredly frame its opinion 
solely in terms of the latter. 
The result is that when it comes to interpreting international 
humanitarian law jurisprudentially, the Committee has essentially 
bound itself to the explicit language of the Civil and Political 
Covenant.  While there are important fundamental rights protected 
in this Covenant, rights that the Committee has demonstrated it is 
committed to upholding, its approach fails to address fully the 
protections of international humanitarian law.  If an individual 
seeks redress through the HRC, he or she must ultimately 
demonstrate a violation of a substantive right prescribed in the 
Civil and Political Covenant. 
This narrow focus has another consequence:  by releasing 
opinions framed entirely within the language of the Civil and 
Political Covenant, the Committee’s decisions lose precedential 
value for other bodies seeking to interpret international 
humanitarian law.  In other words, the HRC’s opinions are easily 
relegated to and contained within the Covenant.  While the 
explanation for the limited holdings is that the HRC’s explicit 
mandate is to consider only violations of the Civil and Political 
Covenant, the outcome is a disconcertingly narrow focus on a 
limited universe of human rights violations. 
In sum, in its Optional Protocol jurisprudence, the HRC largely 
limits itself to considering violations of the Civil and Political 
Covenant.  Where the Covenant overlaps with the Geneva 
Conventions, the Committee may decide and uphold individual 
international humanitarian law protections.  Unfortunately, those 
decisions will be framed entirely within the language of the 
Covenant, and thus may have limited precedential appeal outside 
of the Covenant.  Where the Covenant does not overlap with 
protections offered by the Geneva Conventions, the HRC provides 
no recourse and consequently no legal interpretations. 
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2. GENERAL COMMENTS 
The HRC periodically produces General Comments designed 
to explicate specific protections offered by the Civil and Political 
Covenant.  In marked contrast to the individual submissions, the 
HRC explicitly considers other international instruments in its 
General Comments.  This Section considers the Committee’s 
general approach to other international instruments, and then 
extrapolates from that approach the implications for interpreting 
international humanitarian law.  While the HRC considers other 
international instruments in various contexts, it directly addresses 
the interplay between the Civil and Political Covenant and 
international humanitarian law when considering a state’s 
obligations under Article 4.  The HRC emphasizes that no state 
may invoke Article 4 to derogate from rights protected by other 
international obligations and that in situations of armed conflict, 
the Covenant and international humanitarian law are 
complementary, not exclusive.  While such a position may—via an 
individual complaint alleging a violation of Article 4 during an 
armed conflict—require the Committee to consider all the state’s 
international obligations (including those of international 
humanitarian law), it is unclear what form the Committee’s 
analysis would actually take. 
2.1. General Approach to Other International Instruments 
In its General Comments, the HRC references other 
international instruments or obligations in four different contexts: 
(i) most relevant to international humanitarian law, when the HRC 
discusses possible derogation of rights protected by the Covenant, 
the Committee refers to other international obligations of State 
Parties; (ii) the HRC refers to other international standards when 
interpreting the articles of the Civil and Political Covenant that 
explicitly reference “international law;” (iii) the HRC occasionally 
refers to other international instruments to define terms or clarify 
obligations under the Civil and Political Covenant; and (iv) the 
HRC intermittently addresses states’ international obligations 
beyond the scope of the Covenant.  Each context will be discussed 
in turn. 
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2.1.1. International Obligations Preventing Derogation 
Because Article 4(1) allows states to take measures derogating 
from some of their obligations under the Civil and Political 
Covenant, the Committee has sought to make clear that derogation 
is only permissible to the extent it is compatible with other 
international obligations.  According to the HRC, Article 4 “cannot 
be read as justification for derogation . . . if such derogation would 
entail a breach of the state’s other international obligations, 
whether based on treaty or general international law.”85  The HRC 
also refers to Article 5(2), which protects against derogation of 
fundamental rights recognized in other instruments.86  The 
Committee takes an expansive view of other international 
obligations, referencing, for example, norms of general 
international law,87 international humanitarian law,88 crimes 
against humanity,89 “principles of legality and the rule of law,”90 
various conventions and UN standards,91 and the report of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross on rules of international 
humanitarian law.92  Because a state may not derogate provisions 
representing customary international law, a state may never be 
able to derogate some provisions of the Civil and Political 
Covenant not listed in Article 4(2).93 
 
85 Human Rights Comm., 72nd Sess., General Comment 29: States of Emergency 
(Article 4), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
86 See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, art. 5(2) (recognizing rights 
found in “law, conventions, regulations or custom”).  See, e.g., General Comment 29, 
supra note 85, ¶ 9 (exploring the circumstances under which a state may derogate 
from the Convention); Human Rights Comm., 68th Sess., General Comment 28: 
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) (discussing that there “shall be no 
derogation from the equal enjoyment by women of all fundamental human 
rights”). 
87 General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 13 (providing illustrative examples of 
“elements that in the Committee’s opinion cannot be made subject to lawful 
derogation under article 4”). 
88 Id. ¶ 11. 
89 Id. ¶ 12 (including crimes codified by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court). 
90 Id. ¶ 16 (providing, as an example, elements of the right to a fair trial). 
91 See id. ¶ 10 nn.5–6. 
92 See Id. ¶ 10 n.6. 
93 See id. ¶ 11 (“[T]he category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list 
of nonderogable provisions as given in article 4, paragraph 2.”); Human Rights 
Comm., 52nd Sess., General Comment 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon 
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation 
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General Comment 29 addresses the overlap between the Civil 
and Political Covenant and international humanitarian law.  To 
justify state derogations from the Covenant, Article 4 requires that 
a public emergency threaten the life of a nation.94  Such a situation 
will most likely arise during armed conflict.95  Once an armed 
conflict exists, “rules of international humanitarian law become 
applicable and help . . . to prevent the abuse of a State’s emergency 
powers.”96  In other words, as the Committee expressed in General 
Comment 31, in situations of armed conflict, both the Covenant 
and international humanitarian law apply and “both spheres of 
law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”97  In General 
Comment 28, for example, the HRC applies the Covenant’s 
protections during armed conflict: it notes that women are 
 
to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994) (discussing, albeit in the context of 
invalid reservations, various provisions in the Covenant “that represent 
customary international law”). 
94 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, art. 4(1). 
95 See General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 3 (“If States parties consider 
invoking article 4 in other situations than an armed conflict, they should carefully 
consider the justification and why such a measure is necessary and legitimate in 
the circumstances.”). 
96 Id. 
97 Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., General Comment 31: Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).  The International Court of Justice 
has also endorsed the principle of complementarity: “the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through 
the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the 
[Civil and Political Covenant].”  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 
9).  See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8) (alluding to the principle of complementarity).  While 
complementarity is the predominant view among commentators, both advisory 
opinions are controversial as to their characterization of the relationship between 
the two bodies of law.  See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2005) (indicating the generality with which the decision was 
decided and its lack of specificity regarding these two areas of law); Michael J. 
Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 133–37 (2005) (stating the 
interplay between humanitarian and human rights law remains unclear); Terry 
Gill, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and 
the Fundamental Distinction Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 12 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 613, 616–19 (1999) (analyzing the court’s discussion regarding 
the compatibility of nuclear weapons with Jus ad Bellum). 
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particularly vulnerable in such situations and suggests that State 
parties take preventive measures under Article 3 to protect them.98 
To evaluate states’ claims of an emergency necessitating 
derogation, the HRC deems itself competent to consider states’ 
other international obligations.99  It requests states, therefore, to 
take into account “the developments within international law as to 
human rights standards applicable in emergency situations.”100  
Therefore, while Article 4(2) provides a list of nonderogable rights 
protected by the Civil and Political Covenant, if a state attempts to 
avoid other Covenant obligations under the claim of a national 
emergency, the Committee will look beyond the four corners of the 
Covenant to determine whether the state has complied with all of 
its international obligations.101 
2.1.2. The Covenant’s Explicit References to International Law 
The Civil and Political Covenant explicitly refers to obligations 
under international law in Articles 1 and 4.102  In order for the HRC 
to discuss fully the rights protected by those articles, therefore, the 
Committee must address other international obligations relevant to 
the protected right.  In General Comment 12, discussing the right 
of self-determination protected by Article 1, the Committee 
referred to the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the 
General Assembly on 24 October 1970 (General Assembly 
 
98 See General Comment 28, supra note 86, ¶ 8 (describing the obligations states 
have toward women under Article 3 of Covenant). 
99 General Comment 29 states: 
Although it is not the function of the Human Rights Committee to 
review the conduct of a State party under other treaties, in exercising its 
functions under the Covenant the Committee has the competence to take 
a State party’s other international obligations into account when it 
considers whether the Covenant allows the State party to derogate from 
specific provisions of the Covenant. 
General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 10. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. ¶ 13 (analyzing various other Covenant provisions not listed in Article 
4(2) and concluding that each is protected by other areas of international law and 
that consequently a State could never derogate from those provisions). 
102 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, arts. 1, 4. 
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resolution 2625 (XXV)).103  Similarly, for Article 4, the HRC states 
that the state cannot breach other international obligations, 
“whether based on treaty or general international law.”104 
2.1.3. Looking to Other Instruments to Define Covenant 
Provisions 
In two of its General Comments, the HRC has looked to other 
international instruments to clarify Covenant provisions.  In 
General Comment 18, the HRC sought to define 
“discrimination.”105  Noting that the Covenant provided no 
definition, the HRC consulted the definitions of discrimination 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination106 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.107  The 
Committee then discussed the purpose of the Civil and Political 
Covenant’s prohibition of discrimination, and combined pieces of 
the other conventions’ definitions to construct its own.108 
 
103 Human Rights Comm., 21st Sess., General Comment 12: The Right to Self-
Determination of Peoples (Article 1), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 
1994).  But see Wilson v. Australia, Decision, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., 
No. 1239/2004, ¶ 4.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1239/2004 (2004) (stating that an 
individual cannot claim the status of a victim through Article 1). 
104 General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 9. 
105 Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess., General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 
¶ 6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment 
18]. 
106 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race Discrimination 
Convention] (condemning racial discrimination and committing to take certain 
actions to eliminate it). 
107 General Comment 18 states: 
The Committee notes that the Covenant neither defines the term 
“discrimination” nor indicates what constitutes discrimination.  
However, article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides [a definition for] the term 
“racial discrimination” . . . .  Similarly, article 1 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides [a 
definition for] “discrimination against women” . . . .  
General Comment 18, supra note 105, ¶ 6.  See also Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 
I.L.M. 33 (condemning discrimination against women, committing to eliminate 
such discrimination, and enumerating certain actions to be taken). 
108 See General Comment 18, supra note 105, ¶ 7 (defining discrimination). 
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In General Comment 21, the Committee considered humane 
treatment of those deprived of their liberty.109  Rather than craft its 
own definition of specific protections offered by Article 10, the 
HRC provided the general purpose of Article 10 and encouraged 
states to look to other listed relevant United Nations standards.110 
2.1.4. Broad International Obligations 
The Committee has twice used an article of the Civil and 
Political Covenant as a vehicle to express a much broader view 
about states’ international obligations.  In General Comment 14 
addressing the Article 6 right to life, the HRC described at length 
the danger of nuclear weapons.111  The Committee concluded that 
the “production, testing, possession, deployment and use of 
nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes 
against humanity” and called upon all states, whether parties to 
the Covenant or not, to rid the world of nuclear weapons.112 
In General Comment 17, the Committee addressed the specific 
children’s rights protected by Article 24.113  The HRC noted that 
while the primary purpose of the article is to protect children’s 
civil and political rights, states should also take positive actions to 
address children’s economic, social, and cultural rights.114 
2.2. Implications for the Interpretation of International Humanitarian 
Law 
In various contexts, the HRC must consider other international 
obligations.  Whether insisting that no state may use Article 4(1) of 
the Covenant to avoid other obligations under international law or 
interpreting the explicit references in the Covenant to 
“international law,” the HRC must be ready to evaluate alleged 
 
109 See Human Rights Comm., 44th Sess., General Comment 21: Replaces General 
Comment 9 Concerning Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of Liberty (Article 10), 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 10, 1992) (considering humane treatment in 
the context of Article 10). 
110 Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
111 See Human Rights Comm., 23rd Sess., General Comment 14: Nuclear 
Weapons and the Right to Life (Article 6), ¶¶ 3–7, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
(Nov. 9, 1984) (describing the threat of nuclear weapons). 
112 Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 
113 See Human Rights Comm., 35th Sess., General Comment 17: Rights of the 
Child (Article 24), Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 7, 
1984). 
114 Id.¶ 3. 
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violations of the Covenant against the backdrop of states’ other 
international obligations.  The Committee has expressly recognized 
this logic:  “Although it is not the function of the Human Rights 
Committee to review the conduct of a State party under other 
treaties, in exercising its functions under the Covenant the 
Committee has the competence to take a State party’s other 
international obligations into account. . . .”115 
Nowhere is this duty more evident and necessary than in 
situations of armed conflict.  As the Committee recognizes, it is in 
situations of armed conflict that a state is most likely to derogate 
rights protected by the Covenant.116  When a state derogates such a 
right during armed conflict, the Committee must consider not only 
whether the right may be derogated under the explicit terms of the 
Civil and Political Covenant, but also whether the state can 
permissibly derogate the right under the rules and principles of 
international humanitarian law, customary international law, and 
other relevant obligations.  If such a situation were to arise—for 
example, if an individual alleged under the Optional Protocol that 
a state had violated his or her rights under Article 4(1)—the HRC 
would be required to consider the entire gamut of the state’s 
international obligations, including all the protections of 
international humanitarian law.117  Conceptually, therefore, the 
HRC could be called upon to perform a detailed analysis of 
international humanitarian law protections. 
 
115 General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 10. 
116 Id. ¶ 3. 
117 See General Comment 31, supra note 97, ¶ 11 (“While, in respect of certain 
Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be 
specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both 
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”).  While the HRC’s 
consideration of the overlap between humanitarian and human rights law may be 
born of procedural necessity given Article 4’s reference to “international law,” the 
growing convergence of the two bodies of law is widely recognized.  See, e.g., 
Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 
310 (2007) (discussing historical developments leading to the increasing overlap of 
the two bodies of law); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 
AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 266–73 (2000) (describing the impact of human rights on the 
development of humanitarian law and the growing convergence of the two 
spheres); Michael Bothe, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Rene 
Provost, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 371, 383 (2004) (reviewing RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002)).  The HRC’s consideration of 
humanitarian law, therefore, would be a natural step in this direction. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/3
2010] HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1213 
 
The secondary issue, however, is the form that such an analysis 
would take.  While the General Comments recognize that a state’s 
various international obligations are complementary rather than 
exclusive, they contain little by way of analysis of other 
international obligations.  General Comment 29 provides some 
examples of how certain rights not listed in Article 4(2) may not be 
derogated, but most examples simply state that the protected right 
is a norm of general international law.118  Such a statement is 
instructive as to the level of protection offered by the provision, 
but does not provide any analysis of international humanitarian 
law.  Therefore, if the Committee provides any detailed analysis of 
international humanitarian law, it would most likely do so in an 
individual communication under the Optional Protocol, rather 
than a General Comment. 
The Committee’s tendency to rest its Decisions and Views 
within the language of the Covenant, as well as its reluctance to 
consider or analyze other international instruments explicitly, 
however, make it probable that the Committee would couch its 
conclusion within the language of the Covenant.  This likelihood 
illustrates the inherent tension in the HRC’s jurisprudence: The 
Committee recognizes the Optional Protocol’s purpose as allowing 
it to consider only alleged violations of substantive Covenant 
rights, but some provisions of the Covenant inherently demand 
that it scrutinize other international obligations.119  The result, 
therefore, would likely be that in its response to an individual 
communication alleging a violation of Article 4, the Committee 
would base its holding on a provision of the Civil and Political 
Covenant, and not provide any actual analysis of the state’s 
obligations under international humanitarian law.  To reach such a 
conclusion, the Committee should consider the state’s international 
obligations, but even if it did, it would still probably frame its 
analysis within the language of the Covenant. 
For example, imagine an individual alleged a violation of 
Article 4 of the Covenant based on a claim that the State party had, 
in a situation of internal armed conflict, derogated the right to 
 
118 See General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 13 (listing examples of certain 
rights that cannot be derogated). 
119 Compare General Comment 24, supra note 93, ¶ 13 (describing the object and 
purpose of the Optional Protocol), with General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 10 
(stating the necessity of considering other international obligations for purposes 
of alleged Article 4 violations). 
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humane treatment protected by Article 10.  Article 4(2) does not list 
Article 10 as a nonderogable provision.120  Yet Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions prohibits humiliating and degrading 
treatment.121  Therefore, according to Article 4(1) and the HRC’s 
General Comments, the state could not invoke Article 4 to derogate 
rights protected by other international obligations, which, in this 
example, would be a right protected by Common Article 3.  
Assuming the Committee found that there was a state of 
emergency within the country that met the requirements of Article 
4(1) (in itself a high standard to satisfy),122 the Committee would 
have to find that the state could not derogate Article 10 through 
Article 4. 
What form would the HRC’s Decision and View take?  It is 
possible that the Committee would explicitly reference Common 
Article 3, apply it to the facts alleged, and conclude that the State 
party could not derogate Article 10 through Article 4.  Such a 
 
120 For the sake of this example, imagine that the Committee had not already 
stated in General Comment 29 that Article 10 is nonderogable under general 
international law.  See General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 13(a) (“Although this 
right, prescribed in article 10 of the Covenant, is not separately mentioned in the 
list of nonderogable rights in article 4, paragraph 2, the Committee believes that 
here the Covenant expresses a norm of general international law not subject to 
derogation.”). 
121 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31: 
[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to [persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities during an armed conflict not of international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties]: . . . (c) 
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment . . . . 
Id.; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (prohibiting, with the same language as that found in Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, any outrages upon personal dignity towards persons ); 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 3 (employing the same language as 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field and Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, to the same purpose); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 3 
(applying the same language again to prisoners of war). 
122 See General Comment 29, supra note 85, ¶ 3 (“Even during an armed conflict 
measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that 
the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation.”). 
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holding would provide an informative analysis of international 
humanitarian law.  More likely, however, the Committee would 
state nearly exactly what it did in General Comment 29 when 
considering whether Article 10 could be derogated: “[T]he 
Committee believes here the Covenant expresses a norm of general 
international law not subject to derogation.”123  Such a conclusory 
statement, while contributing to the general recognition of 
customary norms, does not provide much actual precedential 
analysis of international humanitarian law. 
3. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The HRC renders Concluding Observations based on country 
reports it periodically receives from States parties, pursuant to 
Article 40 of the Civil and Political Covenant.124  Unlike the 
individual communications, issues of international humanitarian 
law frequently arise in the Concluding Observations.  This 
tendency may be because it is through the periodic reports that 
State parties must justify states of emergency or situations of 
human rights abuses.  There are also a larger number of countries 
that are signatories to the Covenant and thereby required to submit 
periodic reports than countries that have ratified the Optional 
Protocol, allowing individuals subject to their jurisdiction to 
submit communications.  Perhaps most significantly, however, it is 
the Committee’s approach to evaluating compliance with the 
Covenant that leads it to consider humanitarian law explicitly. 
The Committee has interpreted its mandate with respect to the 
country reports125 as an opportunity to provide a bird’s–eye view 
of the human rights situation in the State party vis-à-vis its 
compliance with the Covenant.  This approach permits the 
Committee to reach outside the Covenant in assessing State 
parties’ implementation and compliance.  The Concluding 
Observations, therefore, offer the Committee’s most extensive and 
explicit consideration of the relation between the Civil and Political 
Covenant and the protections offered by international 
 
123 Id. ¶ 13(a). 
124 See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, art. 40 (requiring States 
parties to submit reports and authorizing the Human Rights Committee to render 
observations). 
125 “The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States 
Parties. . . .  It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may 
consider appropriate, to the States Parties.”  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1216 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
 
humanitarian law.  This Part considers the HRC’s approach to 
reviewing country reports, assesses its resulting treatment of 
humanitarian law, and finds that while the Committee recognizes 
the applicability of humanitarian law, its Concluding Observations 
offer little substantive analysis of the regime. 
3.1. Contextualizing the Covenant: The HRC’s Approach to Assessing 
Periodic Reports 
The Concluding Observations reveal the Committee’s 
willingness to look beyond the Covenant to capture a fuller picture 
of the state of human rights in the State party.  The Committee thus 
often refers generally to other human rights instruments, norms, 
and standards.126  It also refers specifically to other international 
 
126 See Human Rights Comm., 89th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Madagascar, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3 (May 
11, 2007) (“The State party should define torture in its legislation, taking into 
account internationally established norms. . . .”); Human Rights Comm., 83d Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Kenya, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/83/KEN (Apr. 29, 2005) (“The Committee welcomes the fact that the 
State party’s new draft constitution includes a proposed Bill of Rights that is 
inspired by international human rights standards”); Human Rights Comm., 79th 
Sess., Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Comm.: Latvia, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/79/LVA (Dec. 1, 2003) (noting court rulings “removing from the 
national legal system norms conflicting with international human rights 
standards”); Human Rights Comm., 72d Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Guatemala, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM (Aug. 27, 
2001) (noting that the State party should “take the appropriate measures to 
comply with the provisions of international instruments on child labor”); Human 
Rights Comm., 71st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: 
Venezuela, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/VEN (Apr. 26, 2001) (“All law 
enforcement officials should be thoroughly trained in international human rights 
standards, particularly those contained in [arts. 6, 7, and 10 of the] Covenant”); 
Human Rights Comm., 68th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Guyana, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.121 (Apr. 25, 2000) (“The 
Committee also welcomes frequent references to provisions of international 
human rights instruments by the courts”); Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess.,  
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: India, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997) (welcoming “frequent references to 
provisions of international human rights instruments” by national courts); 
Human Rights Comm., 54th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Sri Lanka, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.56 (July 27, 1995) 
(emphasizing that obligations assumed by the State party under “various 
international instruments” must be respected even in times of emergency); 
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Iceland, 
¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.26 (Nov. 3, 1993) (noting with concern that 
Iceland’s constitution lacks provisions to protect “all fundamental human rights 
as recognized in the numerous international human rights treaties, in particular in 
the [Civil and Political Covenant]”); Human Rights Comm., 48th Sess., Concluding 
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instruments, particularly, though not exclusively, as they relate to 
the application of Covenant rights.127  Such references range from 
mere mention128 to use of the document as support in making a 
recommendation129 to the intimation that compliance with the cited 
 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Hungary, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.22 (Aug. 3, 1993) (“The Committee . . . recognizes that much 
remains to be done, especially in the fields of education and training to better 
familiarize judges, practicing lawyers, law-enforcement officials, and the public at 
large with the rights enshrined in the Covenant.”). 
127 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 88th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Honduras, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (Dec. 13, 
2006) (welcoming State party’s ratification of the Rome Statute and accession to 
the Race Discrimination Convention, the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and other 
treaties); Human Rights Comm., 64th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Iceland, ¶¶ 6, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.98 (Nov. 6, 1998) 
(noting that domestic legislation prefers the European Convention over the 
ICCPR though the latter protects more rights). 
128 These references often come in the form of the Committee welcoming the 
State party’s accession to or ratification of a treaty or noting attempts to enact 
domestic legislation in line with the State party’s international obligations.  See, 
e.g., Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Kosovo (Serbia), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (Aug. 14, 2006) 
(noting incorporation into domestic law of crimes as defined in the Rome Statute 
and the CAT); Human Rights Comm., 85th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Paraguay, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2 (Apr. 24, 
2006) (welcoming ratification of CAT, the Rome Statute, and other international 
instruments); Human Rights Comm., 65th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Costa Rica, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.107 (Apr. 8, 
1999) (noting domestic legislation to implement the Race Discrimination 
Convention and ILO Convention No. 169); Human Rights Comm., 64th Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Austria, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.103 (Nov. 19, 1998) (noting that the European Convention has 
been incorporated into the Austrian Constitution). 
129 See Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Spain, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5 (Jan. 5, 2009) 
(recommending that State party “speed up the process of adopting a national 
mechanism for the prevention of torture in accordance with the Optional Protocol 
to the [CAT]”); Human Rights Comm., 91st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Georgia,  ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3 (Nov. 15, 
2007) (recommending establishment of a national mechanism for torture 
prevention per the Optional Protocol to the CAT); Human Rights Comm., 87th 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Central African Republic, 
¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/CO/2 (July 27, 2006) (relying on the Rome 
Statute, supra note 11, in urging State party not to extend the death penalty to new 
crimes); Human Rights Comm., 84th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Yemen, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/84/YEM, (Aug. 9, 2005) (“The 
State party should work towards establishing a national human rights institution 
in accordance with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for 
the promotion and protection of human rights”); Human Rights Comm., 60th 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: France, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
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instrument is a necessary component of fulfilling the State party’s 
substantive obligations under the Civil and Political Covenant.130  
The Committee has also referenced international agreements to 
recommend that states become parties to them, with a view to 
fulfilling their Covenant obligations.131 
The Committee’s reliance on several U.N. non-treaty 
documents is particularly pronounced and noteworthy for the 
extent to which the Committee has connected compliance with 
their provisions to fulfillment of a State party’s Covenant 
obligations.  In thirty-eight Concluding Observations,132 the 
 
CCPR/C/79/Add.80 (Aug. 4, 1997) (“The Committee urges the State party to 
introduce law enforcement training along the lines suggested in the United 
Nations training manual for law enforcement officers.”). 
130 See Human Rights Comm., 71st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Dominican Republic, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM (Apr. 26, 
2001) (“To comply with article 10 of the Covenant, the State party needs to 
establish as soon as possible a specialized prison guard service . . . that meets the 
[Standard Minimum Rules] . . . .”); Human Rights Comm., 57th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Nigeria, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.65 (July 24, 1996) (“The Committee emphasizes that it is 
incompatible with the Covenant to hold prisoners under conditions which do not 
meet the basic guarantees provided in article 10 of the Covenant as well as in the 
[Standard Minimum Rules]”). 
131 See Human Rights Comm., 86th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Congo, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/COD/CO/3 (Apr. 26, 2006) 
(“The Committee recommends that the State party should endorse the draft law 
on the implementation of the Rome Statute, and ratify and enforce the Agreement 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court.”); Human 
Rights Comm., 55th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: 
Estonia, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.59 (Nov. 9, 1995) (suggesting that 
Estonia accede to the Refugees Convention, in connection with bringing its 
treatment of asylum-seekers into compliance with the Covenant); Human Rights 
Comm., 49th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Japan, ¶ 16, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.28 (Nov. 5, 1993) (recommending that Japan become 
party to the CAT). 
132 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Central African Republic, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/CAF/CO/2 (July 27, 2006) (“The State party should ensure that the 
conditions of detention in the country’s prisons are compatible with the Standard 
Minimum Rules”); Human Rights Comm., 86th Sess., Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/COD/CO/3 (Apr. 26, 2006) (noting that prison conditions threaten the 
protections offered by Article 10 and recommending State party ensure that 
conditions are compatible with the Standard Minimum Rules); Human Rights 
Comm., 82d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Poland, ¶ 12, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL (Dec. 2, 2004) (encouraging the state party to 
consider alternative forms of punishment in order to ensure compliance with 
Article 10); Human Rights Comm., 61st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Jamaica, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.83 (Nov. 19, 1997) 
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Committee refers to or relies upon the U.N. Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.133  The HRC has situated the 
Standard Minimum Rules within the protections offered by Article 
10 such that it is likely to find that prison conditions failing to meet 
the Standard Minimum Rules violate that provision.134  The 
Committee has similarly linked the U.N. Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (“Basic 
Principles”)135 to the protections offered by Articles 6, 7, and 10.136  
 
(noting that some prison conditions, such as lack of sanitation, lighting, adequate 
diet, adequate staff training, and lack of visitation of prisoners, are incompatible 
with the Minimum Standard Rules and Article 10); Human Rights Comm., 56th 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Zambia, ¶¶ 13, 25, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.62 (Apr. 3, 1996) (suggesting that urgent steps be taken to 
reduce the number of prisoners in order to comply with the Standard Minimum 
Rules and Article 10); Human Rights Comm., 50th Sess., Concluding Observations of 
the Human Rights Comm.: Costa Rica, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.31 (Apr. 
18, 1994) (recommending that measures be taken to strengthen the rights of 
detainees). 
133 See Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 55 (providing a minimum 
standard of care). 
134 See., e.g., Human Rights Comm., 71st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Dominican Republic, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM 
(Apr. 26, 2001) (“To comply with article 10 of the Covenant, the State party needs 
to establish as soon as possible a specialized prison guard service . . . that meets 
the [Standard Minimum Rules]”); Human Rights Comm., 66th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Poland, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.110 (July 29, 1999) (“The State party should effectively improve 
facilities for prisoners so as to comply with the [Standard Minimum Rules]”); 
Human Rights Comm., 57th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Nigeria, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65 (July 24, 1996) (noting that 
the poor prison conditions are incompatible with Article 10 and the [Standard 
Minimum Rules]). 
135 See Basic Principles, supra note 52. 
136 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 88th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Honduras, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (Dec. 13, 
2006) (“Another cause for concern is the failure to apply in practice the Basic 
Principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials”); Human 
Rights Comm., 77th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: 
Estonia, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/77/EST (Apr. 15, 2003) (inviting State party to 
amend legislation “to ensure that the use of firearms is restricted by the principles 
of necessity and proportionality as reflected in paragraphs 9 and 16 of the [Basic 
Principles] (articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant)”); Human Rights Comm., 53d Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: United States, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Apr. 7, 1995) (“The Committee urges that rules and 
regulations governing the use of weapons by the police and security forces be in 
full conformity with the United Nations’ Basic Principles”); Human Rights 
Comm., 51st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Cyprus, ¶ 
18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.39 (Aug. 3, 1994) (noting police instruction 
should be in conformity with the Covenant and the Basic Principles). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1220 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
 
Less frequently, the HRC references other U.N. documents.137  The 
Committee thus uses its Concluding Observations to reach outside 
the Covenant both to offer recommendations and to survey the 
Covenant’s interaction with other human rights instruments.138 
As in its Decisions and Views, the Committee has explicitly 
addressed the relationship between the Civil and Political 
Covenant and the European Convention139 in its Concluding 
Observations.140  Unlike the Decisions and Views, however, the 
 
137 See., e.g., Human Rights Comm., 95th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Sweden, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6 (May 7, 2009) 
(“The State party should provide adequate training to prison officials on suicide 
prevention and assure observance of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners”); 
Human Rights Comm., 90th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Czech Republic, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2 (Sept. 9, 2008) 
(referencing Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care); Human Rights Comm., 92nd Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2 (Apr. 17, 2008) (“The State 
party should find durable solutions for all [internally displaced persons] in 
consultation with the remaining displaced persons and in accordance with the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”); Human Rights Comm., 64th Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ¶ 14, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.101 (Nov. 6, 1998) (“The Committee recommends 
that measures be taken to ensure full compliance with Article 14 of the Covenant 
as well as the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary and the Basic Principles on the Roles of Lawyers”); Human Rights 
Comm., 54th Sess., Concluding observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Russian 
Federation, ¶¶ 35-36, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995) 
(recommending adoption of new rules to comply with the United Nations Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment and urging prompt enactment of legislation incorporating its Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary). 
138 A statement made in response to a report from Uzbekistan typifies the 
Committee’s approach: the HRC notes with interest a Supreme Court decision 
providing that domestic anti-torture laws must be interpreted in light of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, but expresses concern “at the apparently narrow definition of 
torture in the State party’s Criminal Code.”  Human Rights Comm., 83d Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Uzbekistan, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/83/UZB (Apr. 26, 2005). 
139 See European Convention, supra note 52. 
140 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 91st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Austria, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4 (Oct. 30, 2007) 
(urging the State party to ensure that “judges and law enforcement officers receive 
adequate training to apply and interpret domestic law in light of the Covenant”); 
Human Rights Comm., 83d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Iceland, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/ISL (Apr. 25, 2005) (“The Committee 
encourages the State party to ensure that all rights protected under the Covenant 
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Concluding Observations are concerned with the aggregate 
protections offered by the respective treaty regimes, not with the 
similarity of particular claims.141  The Committee has made clear 
that the Civil and Political Covenant offers a wider range of 
protection than the European Convention.142 
In several Concluding Observations, the Committee has also 
referenced pronouncements by other international bodies in 
assessing compliance with the Covenant.  In response to a report 
from Nicaragua, the Committee cited Articles 25 and 27 of the 
 
are given effect in Icelandic law); Human Rights Comm., 64th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Austria, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.103 (Nov. 19, 1998) (recommending that the State party ensure 
that all rights protected under the Covenant are given effect); Human Rights 
Comm., 64th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Iceland, ¶ 8, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.98 (Nov. 6, 1998) (encouraging the State party to 
give effect to all rights protected under the Covenant); Human Rights Comm., 
58th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Denmark, ¶ 11, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.68 (Nov. 18, 1996) (expressing concern that the Covenant 
has not been given the status of domestic legislation); Human Rights Comm., 47th 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Belgium, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.3 (Sept. 25, 1992) (“The Committee recommends to the State 
party more adequately to reflect in internal administrative practice the provisions 
of the Covenant which are not reflected in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”). 
141 Where an individual brings claims before both the European Court of 
Human Rights and the HRC under the Optional Protocol, the Committee must 
determine that the allegedly violated Covenant right is sufficiently distinct from 
the right protected by the European Convention for the communication to be 
admissible.  See Section 1.1.1, supra (discussing the Committee’s approach to the 
question of overlap in its Decisions and Views). 
142 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 95th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Sweden, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6 (May 7, 2009) 
(“[T]he Covenant may accord additional protection beyond what is accorded 
under the European Convention on Human Rights”); Human Rights Comm., 83d 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Iceland, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/83/ISL (Apr. 25, 2005) (noting that the European Convention has been 
incorporated into domestic law, but that such domestic incorporation does not 
satisfy Iceland’s Covenant obligations because “several Covenant provisions, 
including articles 4, 12, 22, 25 and 27, go beyond the scope of the ECHR”); Human 
Rights Comm., 64th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: 
Iceland, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.98 (Nov. 6, 1998) (“[T]he Committee 
emphasizes that a number of the articles of the Covenant, including articles 3, 4, 
12, 22, 24, 25, 26, and 27, go beyond the provisions of the European Convention.”); 
Human Rights Comm., 49th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Malta, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.29 (Nov. 5, 1993) (expressing 
concern at the apparent preference accorded to the European Convention in 
domestic law and noting that the Civil and Political Covenant “guarantees a 
number of human rights not protected under the European Convention”). 
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Covenant in observing143 that the State party had not fully 
complied with a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights regarding indigenous communities’ participation in 
elections.144  In urging Macedonia to renew investigation of its 
involvement in the rendition of Khalid Al-Masri, the Committee 
referenced the concerns expressed by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, among other bodies.145  The 
Committee similarly cited a decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in criticizing UK legislation that prohibited 
convicted prisoners from voting.146  Compared to the Committee’s 
reliance on treaties and other international instruments, however, 
such references are rare.  The HRC apparently references 
pronouncements of other international bodies only to support a 
finding that a State party has deviated from its substantive 
obligations under the Covenant. 
3.2. Treatment of International Humanitarian Law 
The Committee’s approach to evaluating Covenant compliance 
has led it to consider international humanitarian law and armed 
conflict more frequently in its Concluding Observations than in its 
General Comments or individual decisions.  The Committee 
repeatedly recognizes the adverse impact of armed conflict on the 
application of Covenant rights.147  It has made clear, however, that 
 
143 See Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Nicaragua ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (Dec. 12, 
2008) (noting that Nicaragua “should meet the targets laid down in [the 
decision]”). 
144 See Yatama v. Nicaragua, case 12.388, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 125/01 
(2005) (ruling that Nicaragua had violated equal suffrage). 
145 See Human Rights Comm., 92d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2 (Apr. 17, 2008) (noting concerns of the European 
Parliament’s Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by 
the CIA for the Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, the Council of 
Europe and citing Articles 2, 7, 9, 10 of the Civil and Political Covenant). 
146 See Human Rights Comm., 93d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 
(July 30, 2008) (citing Articles 10 and 25 of the Covenant); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 
37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 35 (2008) (criticizing the United Kingdom for its 
application of principles of Article 3). 
147 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 61st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child: The Sudan, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 
(Nov. 19, 1997) (“[T]he armed conflict is an obstacle to the full implementation of 
the Covenant.”); Human Rights Comm., 54th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
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under Articles 2(1) and 4, Covenant protections apply regardless of 
the applicability of the rules of international humanitarian law and 
that a State party is responsible for the actions of its agents, even 
beyond its territory.148  The Committee also scrutinizes states’ 
claims to a “state of emergency” and resulting derogations from 
Covenant protections.149  This scrutiny, however, is typically 
 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Sri Lanka, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.56 
(July 27, 1995) (noting that armed conflict “adversely affect[s] the application of 
the Covenant”); Human Rights Comm., 51st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Azerbaijan, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.38 
(Aug. 3, 1994) (“[T]he situation of armed conflict with a neighboring country and 
the recurrent internal unrest are affecting the exercise of human rights in 
Azerbaijan”). 
148 See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child: Belgium, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/BEL (Aug. 12, 2004) 
(“[T]he Covenant automatically applies when [the State party] exercises power or 
effective control over a person outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained.”); Human 
Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: 
Germany, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/80/DEU (May 4, 2004) (“[The Committee] 
reiterates that the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law 
does not preclude accountability of State parties under [Article 2(i)] of the 
Covenant.”); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child: Israel, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 12, 2003) (“Nor 
does the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law preclude 
accountability of State parties under [Article 2(i)] of the Covenant.”); Human 
Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Israel, 
¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) (“[The Committee] 
emphasizes that the applicability of rules of humanitarian law does not by itself 
impede the application of the Covenant or the accountability of the State under 
[Article 2(i)].”). 
149 E.g., Human Rights Comm., 81st Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Serbia and Montenegro, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/81/SEMO (Aug. 12, 2004) (expressing concern over the derogations 
taken during a state of emergency); Human Rights Comm., 88th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Israel, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (expressing concern “about the sweeping 
nature of measures during the state of emergency” and finding that they 
derogated from Covenant protections “more extensively than what in the 
Committee’s view is permissible pursuant to article 4”); Human Rights Comm., 
72d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Guatemala, 
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM (Aug. 27, 2001) (expressing concern over the 
“wide variety of possible states of emergency listed in the Constitution”); Human 
Rights Comm., 71st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child: Croatia, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/HRV (Apr. 30, 2001) (expressing 
concern that a constitutional provision is incompatible with Article 4 of the 
Covenant); Human Rights Comm., 63d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child: Israel, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 
1998) (recommending “the Government review the necessity for the continued 
renewal of the state of emergency with a view to limiting as far as possible its 
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limited to a pronouncement that, for example, emergency powers 
or derogations permitted by domestic law are “too broad” or “not 
in conformity” with Article 4.150  Though it often refers to its 
General Comment 29 in this context, the HRC has not analyzed 
derogations in light of other international obligations, as intimated 
in that Comment and described above.151 
In various Concluding Observations, the Committee ties 
Covenant provisions to the regime of international humanitarian 
law.  For example, in response to the Central African Republic’s 
report, the Committee stated: “The Committee notes with concern 
that, to date, the authorities have not carried out any exhaustive 
and independent appraisal of serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law in the Central African 
Republic and that the victims have received no reparations (arts. 2, 
6 and 7).”152  In other words, the Committee placed “serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” 
into the protections offered by Articles 2, 6, and 7 of the Civil and 
Political Covenant.  In the Sudan, the Committee noted 
widespread serious human rights violations in the context of 
armed conflict, and tied the violations to Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, and 
12.153  The Committee has similarly linked Serbia’s failure to fully 
cooperate with the ICTY in investigating and prosecuting violators 
of international humanitarian law with Article 2 of the Covenant.154 
 
scope and territorial applicability and the associated derogation of rights”); 
Human Rights Comm., Comments of the Human Rights Comm.: Ireland, ¶ 11, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.21 (Aug. 3, 1993) (stating that the continued existence of a 
special court established pursuant to emergency powers legislation is not 
“justified in the present circumstances” and that such measures “are of a character 
that normally fall to be notified under article 4 of the Covenant,” which the State 
party had not done). 
150 Human Rights Comm., 46th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: United Republic of Tanzania, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.12 
(Dec. 28, 1992). 
151 See supra Section 2.2 (discussing how the HRC has not analyzed 
derogations in light of other international obligations). 
152 Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Central African Republic, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/CO/2 (Jul. 
27, 2006) (explaining how the authorities have not conducted any appraisals). 
153 See Human Rights Comm., 90th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: The Sudan, supra note 147, ¶ 9 (noting the widespread 
serious human rights violations). 
154 See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child: Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 149, ¶ 11: 
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Considering a report from Belgium, the Committee tied 
Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 16, and 26 of the Covenant to “serious violations 
of international humanitarian law” and conduct “contrary to 
human rights.”155  Specifically, the Committee expressed its 
concern with the repeal of a 1993 act that provided a legal remedy 
for breaches of international humanitarian law.156  The HRC’s 
citation to Articles 2, 5, 16, and 26 suggests that the remedy also 
facilitated substantive Covenant rights, such as Article 2’s 
guarantee of an effective remedy for violations of “rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized.”157  The implication is that the 
protections of international humanitarian law are also to be found 
within the various provisions of the Covenant.  The Committee 
similarly found “credible and uncontested information” that the 
United States was secretly detaining people in violation of rights 
protected by Articles 7 and 9.158  It stated that the United States 
should grant the International Committee of the Red Cross 
“prompt access to any person detained in connection with an 
armed conflict.”159 
In several Concluding Observations, the Committee notes as 
relevant the establishment of domestic mechanisms relating to 
international humanitarian law.160  Considering a report from El 
 
The Committee notes the State party’s public statements emphasizing its 
commitment to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to ensure that all persons 
suspected of grave human rights violations, including war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, are brought to trial.  However, it remains 
concerned at the State party’s repeated failure to fully cooperate with 
ICTY, including with regard to the arrest of indictees (art. 2). 
Id. 
155 Human Rights Comm., 81st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Belgium, supra note 148, ¶¶ 9-10. 
156 See id. ¶ 9 (stating that the State should guarantee the victim’s right to an 
effective remedy).  See generally Luc Reydams, Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 
August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 5, 679 passim (2003) (describing the law and the changes brought on by the 
2003 amendments). 
157 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, art. 2(3). 
158 See Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: United States of America, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (urging the United States to cease its 
practice of secret detention). 
159 Id. 
160 See e.g., Human Rights Comm., 84th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/84/SYR 
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Salvador, the Committee expressed its concern that police 
recruitment procedures do not bar those “who might have 
committed violations of human rights or humanitarian law.”161  
Such references further reflect the Committee’s understanding that 
the rights protected by the Civil and Political Covenant are closely 
linked to the protections of international humanitarian law. 
On two occasions, the Committee has invoked the Geneva 
Conventions.162  The Committee stated that the Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld163 decision “establishing the applicability of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,” reflected “fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Covenant in any armed conflict.”164  The 
Committee subsequently noted that the protections of a regularly 
constituted court offered by the decision remain to be 
implemented, pursuant to Article 14 of the Covenant.165  In other 
words, while the Committee did not explicitly tie Common Article 
3 to articles of the Civil and Political Covenant, it expressed its 
position that the Civil and Political Covenant protects all Common 
Article 3 protections.  The Committee’s relation of the fair trial 
protection of Common Article 3 to the similar protection of Article 
14 of the Covenant implies that the various protections of Common 
 
(Aug. 9, 2005) (welcoming “the establishment of the National Committee for 
International Humanitarian Law”); Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Colombia, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/80/COL (May 26, 2004) (noting the establishment of a human rights 
and international humanitarian law unit in the Ministry of External Relations); 
Human Rights Comm., 61st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Senegal, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.82 (Nov. 19, 1997) (noting the 
establishment of domestic mechanisms relating to international humanitarian 
law). 
161  Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: El Salvador, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/SLV (Aug. 22, 2003). 
162 In one other instance, the Committee mentioned the Geneva Conventions, 
but only to commend Colombia for ratifying the Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions.  See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Colombia, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (May 3, 1997) 
(“The Committee welcomes the recent establishment of an office of the High 
Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights in Colombia, as well as the ratification 
by Colombia of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts.”). 
163 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
164 Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: United States of America, supra note 158, ¶ 5. 
165 See id. ¶ 20 (noting that the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision has not yet been 
implemented).  
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Article 3 could be similarly placed within relevant Covenant 
protections.  In an early Concluding Observation, the HRC 
encouraged Croatia to hold prisoners “in accordance with the 
Geneva Conventions and the Covenant,”166 but did not specifically 
link the two treaties. 
Beyond tying provisions of the Civil and Political Covenant to 
international humanitarian law, the Committee has emphasized 
that states must investigate and prosecute persons accused of 
having committed serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.167 The Committee 
frames this duty under Articles 2, 6, and 7 of the Covenant.168  Like 
 
166 Human Rights Comm., 46th Sess., Comments of the Human Rights Comm.: 
Croatia, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.15 (Dec. 28, 1992). 
167 See Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Spain, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5 (Jan. 5, 2009) 
(suggesting that State parties take steps to ensure the “non-applicability of a 
statute of limitations” on crimes against humanity, and reduce judicial and 
administrative burdens for victims’ families); Human Rights Comm., 92d Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO92 (Apr. 17, 2008) (emphasizing 
the law of Amnesty does not apply to persons accused of committing serious 
violations of international humanitarian law); Human Rights Comm., 87th Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Kosovo (Serbia), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (Aug. 14, 2006) (emphasizing that states must investigate 
“all outstanding cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnically 
motivated crimes committed before and after 1999. . . .”); Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Comm.: Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 149, ¶¶ 11- 12 
(suggesting that the State party should cooperate with the ICTV in the 
prosecution and apprehension of those accused of committing violations of 
international humanitarian law); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Colombia, supra note 160, ¶ 8 (“[T]he State party should ensure that the 
proposed legislation on the alternative penalties to imprisonment does not grant 
impunity to persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.”); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: El Salvador, supra 
note 161, ¶ 11 (asserting that the State party should take steps to ensure that no 
one in the National Civil Police has committed violations of human rights law); 
Human Rights Comm., 71st Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Croatia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/HRV (Apr. 30, 2001) (calling upon 
the State party to ensure that the Amnesty law is not applied to grant impunity to 
accused human rights violators); Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations of 
the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Cambodia, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.108 
(July 27, 1999) (emphasizing that the State part6y must bring Khmer Rouge 
leaders to trial promptly). 
168 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Serbia and 
Montenegro, supra note 149, ¶¶ 11-12 (expressing concerns related to Articles 2, 6, 
and 7 and recommending that “The State party should take all necessary 
measures to ensure that those responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are brought to justice, to ensure that justice is carried out in a fair 
manner and to establish an adequate system for witness protection.”); Concluding 
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its review of derogations, however, the HRC’s remarks in this 
regard are largely conclusory and provide little actual analysis of 
humanitarian law. 
The Committee, moreover, has long recognized terrorism as an 
obstacle to the application of Covenant rights169 and has expressed 
increasing concern about anti-terrorism measures in the wake of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001.170  Though it does not explicitly 
delineate the relationship between the “war on terror” and the 
applicability of humanitarian law, the HRC’s discussion of the 
Covenant in this context is illuminating in view of the numerous 
linkages it perceives between the two bodies of law, particularly 
Common Article 3’s reflection of “fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the Covenant in any armed conflict.”171 
 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Croatia, supra note 167, ¶ 10 (“[T]he 
Committee remains deeply concerned that many cases involving violations of 
articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant committed during the armed conflict  . . . have not 
yet been adequately investigated . . . .”). 
169 See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Comm.: Peru, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.8 (Sept. 25, 1992) (condemning 
“terrorist violence, which shows no consideration for the most basic human 
rights”); Human Rights Comm., 57th Sess., Preliminary Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Peru, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.  CCPR/C79/Add.67 (July 25, 1996) (“[M]any of 
the measures adopted by the Government [to combat terrorism] have frustrated 
implementation of the rights protected under the Covenant.”); Human Rights 
Comm., 56th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Spain, ¶ 3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.61 (Apr. 3, 1996) (noting that terrorist attacks “affect 
the application of the Covenant in Spain”). 
170 Anti-terrorism legislation is often linked to States’ obligations under 
Security Council Resolution 1373, which called upon States to “[t]ake the 
necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. . . .”  S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 
2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  See Human Rights Comm., 75th 
Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: New Zealand, ¶ 11, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/CO/75/NZL (Aug. 7, 2002) (recognizing that “security requirements 
relating to the events of 11 September 2001” have rightly given rise to anti-
terrorism measures, but expressing concern about “possible negative effects of the 
new legislation and practices on asylum-seekers”); Human Rights Comm., 75th 
Sess.,  Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Yemen, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/75/YEM (July 26, 2002) (“While it understands the security 
requirements connected with the events of 11 September 2001, the Committee 
expresses its concern about the effects of this campaign on the human rights 
situation in Yemen. . . .”); Human Rights Comm., 74th Sess., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Sweden, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Apr. 24, 2002) (expressing concern about the effect of the 
“international campaign against terrorism,” linked to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, on the human rights situation in Sweden). 
171 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: United States of 
America, supra note 158, ¶ 5. 
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The Committee’s silence as to the link between humanitarian 
law and the war on terrorism is perhaps unsurprising given the 
complexity of assessing which provisions of humanitarian law, if 
any, apply to a war characterized by attacks from globalized non-
state actors.172  International terrorism thus challenges the 
traditional international/non-international bifurcation of armed 
conflict that provides the point of departure for determining which 
humanitarian law principles apply.173  Humanitarian law may not 
apply at all, moreover, if the war on terror is conceptualized solely 
in terms of law enforcement, i.e., in the absence of “armed 
conflict,” in which case human rights law would provide the 
governing framework.174  The choice, however, is not so stark.  
That the war on terrorism can be situated in both law enforcement 
 
172 The threshold question is whether military action from such actors can 
amount to an “armed attack,” triggering the right of self-defense, and, with 
“armed conflict,” the applicability of humanitarian law.  Compare LESLIE C. GREEN, 
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 54–55 (2d. ed. 2000) (noting the 
traditional view that international law regulates only states and that for an armed 
conflict to warrant regulation conflict to “warrant regulation by the international 
law of armed conflict was necessary for the situation to amount to . . . a contention 
between states . . . .”) with Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed 
Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 41, 47–51 (2002) 
(arguing that the 9/11 attacks constituted an “armed attack” and stating that the 
“U.S. interpretation of the incidents as an armed attack was largely accepted by 
other nations”) and RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 102 (2003) (stating with 
regard to the tremendous damage inflicted by the 9/11 attacks that, “stretching 
the international law doctrine of self-defense to include a non-state actor seemed 
reasonable and necessary”). 
173 If the war on terror constitutes an “international armed conflict,” the four 
Geneva Conventions, Geneva Protocol I, and other humanitarian law principles 
apply.  “Armed conflicts not of an international character” are subject to a 
different subset of humanitarian law principles: either the broadly applicable 
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II, which defines non-international 
armed conflicts more narrowly.  See, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of 
War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 33–41 (2003) (arguing that September 11 triggered an 
“armed conflict not of an international character” and hence Common Article 3 is 
applicable). 
174 See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights 
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–6 (2004) (discussing 
the limited impact of humanitarian law on situations that “do not reach a level 
above ‘internal, disturbances and tensions. . . .’”).  Of course, the broad 
proposition that humanitarian law does not apply to the war on terror was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which held that Common 
Article 3 “affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under 
the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a 
non-signatory ‘Power’ who are involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ a 
signatory.”  548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006). 
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and international armed conflict paradigms175 highlights the need 
for authoritative interpretations of humanitarian law in this 
context. 
The Committee has expressed a variety of concerns about the 
impact on Covenant rights of states’ responses to terrorism.  Anti-
terrorism legislation may be overbroad or vague, leading to 
indiscriminate enforcement threatening Covenant rights.176  Such 
laws may directly conflict with the Covenant and in some cases 
amount to an impermissible derogation of Covenant rights.177  
Alleged terrorists may be subjected to arbitrary detention, ill-
treatment, or torture.178  Anti-terrorism laws may also raise issues 
 
175 See Watkin, supra note 174, at 6(“[T]he challenge of international terrorism 
does not need to be dealt with exclusively under either criminal law or the law of 
armed conflict.”); Murphy, supra note 172, at 49 (“[T]here is no need to view the 
September 11 incidents as presenting a binary choice between being regarded 
either as a criminal act or as a use of force amounting to an armed attack.  In fact, 
the incidents can properly be characterized as both a criminal act and an armed 
attack.”). 
176 E.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Spain, supra note 
167, ¶ 10 (noting “potentially too broad scope of the definitions of terrorism in 
domestic law” which “could lead to violations of several of the rights enshrined in 
the Covenant”); Human Rights Comm., 86th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Norway, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5 (Apr. 25, 
2006) (expressing concern about the “potentially overbroad reach of the definition 
of terrorism” and stating that Norway “should ensure that its legislation adopted 
in the context of the fight against terrorism . . . is limited to the crimes that deserve 
to attract the grave consequences associated with terrorism”); Human Rights 
Comm., 83d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.:  Mauritius, 
¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/MUS (Apr. 27, 2005) (criticizing domestic 
terrorism legislation “as the notion of terrorism is vague and lends itself to broad 
interpretations”); Human Rights Comm., 82d Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.:  Morocco, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/82/MAR (Dec. 1, 2004) 
(expressing concern about the broad definition of “terrorist act” and 
recommending that State party “ensure compliance with the provisions of article 
15 and all the other provisions of the Covenant”). 
177 See Human Rights Comm., 95th Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: Australia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (May 7, 
2009) (noting that some provisions of domestic anti-terrorism legislation “appear 
to be incompatible with the Covenant rights, including with nonderogable 
provisions”); Human Rights Comm., 73d Sess., Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Comm.: United Kingdom, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (Dec. 6, 
2001) (noting that adoption of legislative measures to combat terrorism “may 
require derogations from human rights obligations” and urging that any such 
measures be “in full compliance with the provisions of the Covenant, including, 
when applicable, the provisions on derogation contained in article 4 of the 
Covenant”). 
178 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Yemen, supra note 
129, ¶ 13 (“The Committee remains concerned . . . about reported grave violations 
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of impunity where law enforcement officials are exempted from 
liability for acts stemming from counter-terrorist operations.179  
After the events of September 11, 2001, the crux of the Committee’s 
most frequently elucidated concern to ensure that “the fear of 
terrorism . . . [does] not become a source of abuse.”180 
Accordingly, the “war on terrorism” presents an array of 
problems as to which the Committee recognizes humanitarian law 
is applicable.  The Concluding Observations, however, do not 
explicitly refer to humanitarian law in seeking to address these 
problems.  Rather, the Committee frames its concern about 
terrorism-inspired abuse entirely in terms of the Civil and Political 
Covenant. 
3.3. Summary 
The Committee uses its Concluding Observations to take a 
broader view of the human rights situation in the State party.  
Taking into account the relationship between the Covenant and 
other human rights instruments, the HRC often relies on these 
instruments in making recommendations and drawing conclusions 
as to the human rights situation in the State party.  This approach 
has led the HRC to link protections of the Civil and Political 
Covenant explicitly to those offered by international humanitarian 
law.  The Committee has further emphasized that a state may only 
derogate from those protections in accordance with Article 4 and 
its General Comment 29.  A state may be held responsible for 
violations committed by its agents on foreign soil and a state also 
has the responsibility to investigate and prosecute individuals 
accused of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, or 
other serious human rights abuses. 
While the Concluding Observations offer the Committee’s most 
explicit and substantial treatment of international humanitarian 
 
of articles 6, 7, 9 and 14 of the Covenant committed in the name of the anti-
terrorism campaign.”); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Spain, 
supra note 169, ¶ 10 (expressing concern at “numerous reports . . .  of ill-treatment 
and even torture inflicted on persons suspected of acts of terrorism by members of 
the security forces”). 
179 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Russian Federation, 
supra note 170, ¶ 13 (expressing concern over legislation exempting law 
enforcement and military personnel from liability for violations committed during 
counter-terrorist efforts, citing Articles 2, 6, 7, and 9). 
180 Human Rights Comm., 75th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Comm.: Yemen, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/YEM (July 26, 2002). 
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law, they do not provide the robust analysis necessary for a 
precedential interpretation.  The same approach that compels the 
Committee to consider humanitarian law has also hindered it in 
providing such an analysis: humanitarian law is explored only to 
the limited extent necessary to contextualize the Covenant rights at 
issue.  In short, the Committee links humanitarian law to 
provisions of the Covenant but provides virtually no substantive 
analysis of humanitarian law itself. 
The “war on terror” likewise presents a host of issues, 
including wartime detention, to which the HRC recognizes 
international humanitarian law may apply.  The Committee’s 
recognition of an expanding propensity for abuse in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks highlights the need to explore 
humanitarian law’s potential to address these issues.  The 
Committee, however, does not even invoke humanitarian law in 
this context, relying instead on the provisions of the Covenant. 
4. DECISIONS AND VIEWS 
The HRC performs three separate functions that result in 
written interpretations: its Decisions and Views taken pursuant to 
individual complaints received under the Optional Protocol, its 
General Comments elaborating Covenant protections, and its 
Concluding Observations issued in response to periodic country 
reports by member states.  The Committee does not perform these 
three functions in isolation: in its Decisions and Views it frequently 
references its General Comments, in its General Comments it 
summarizes its experience in making Concluding Observations, 
and in its Concluding Observations it occasionally references its 
General Comments and its Decisions and Views. 
Nonetheless, the Committee varies distinctly among its three 
functions regarding the method of analysis employed and the 
utilization of other international instruments.  In its Decisions and 
Views, the Committee avoids referencing other international 
instruments, although in recent sessions it has utilized them 
slightly more as support for its findings.  The Committee has been 
presented with little opportunity to consider international 
humanitarian law, as most individual communications have not 
supported their claims with the rules of international humanitarian 
law.  The Committee’s analysis, therefore, largely relies on 
considering its own jurisprudence and only in very rare situations 
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has the Committee explicitly considered other international 
instruments as relevant. 
In its General Comments, the Committee explicitly 
acknowledges other international obligations and takes care to 
determine that Covenant protections comply.  The General 
Comments, however, tend to provide conclusory statements of 
broad policy rather than fact-based analysis.  The Committee 
frequently cites to its jurisprudence under its Decisions and Views 
to support its statements. 
In the Concluding Observations, the Committee takes a 
broader view of a state’s obligations and places Covenant 
protections within the general framework of human rights 
protections.  The Concluding Observations do not provide much in 
the way of analysis; instead, they offer broad statements that 
generally frame a state’s obligations. 
From a conceptual standpoint, the HRC is essentially 
performing all the analysis needed to provide authoritative 
interpretations of international humanitarian law.  First, under its 
Concluding Observations, it links international humanitarian 
protections to Covenant protections.  Second, the General 
Comments further explain the nature of the protections offered by 
the Civil and Political Covenant.  Third, the case-by-case analysis 
of individual complaints, based frequently on the General 
Comments, demonstrates when a state violates its obligations 
under the Covenant on a specific, fact-based level.  Logically, if an 
individual complaint arises from a situation of armed conflict, the 
Committee may be considering the rules of international 
humanitarian law through the Covenant. 
The problem, however, is that the Committee will only 
implicitly consider international humanitarian law.  One would 
still need to work backward from a Decision and View to 
determine whether the Committee’s finding actually dealt with 
international humanitarian law.  For example, if the Committee 
found a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant, it would base that 
decision on its jurisprudence and perhaps a General Comment.  
Even though the Committee has stated that a violation of Article 7 
may entail a violation of international humanitarian law,181 there 
would be no practical way to determine whether the Covenant 
 
181 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Central African 
Republic, supra note 129, ¶ 8 (observing that no investigation of violations of 
Article 7 had yet been carried out in the Central African Republic). 
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violation also constituted a violation of international humanitarian 
law because the Committee would only explicitly find a violation 
of the Covenant. 
The result is that despite the amount of analysis the HRC 
performs, it does not create effective precedent beyond the Civil 
and Political Covenant.  Although the Committee may deal with 
violations of international humanitarian law, its conclusions—
whether through the Decisions and Views, the General Comments, 
or the Concluding Observations—are inevitably framed through 
the Covenant. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The situation is as follows: the HRC can competently analyze 
human rights violations occurring in situations of armed conflict.  
Its resulting interpretations, however, are framed through the Civil 
and Political Covenant, not through the rules of international 
humanitarian law.  To provide a precedential interpretation of 
international humanitarian law, there are two basic options: either 
the HRC can broaden its scope to include analysis of international 
humanitarian protections when it speaks to issues occurring in the 
context of armed conflict or a separate body can be created to 
address alleged violations of international humanitarian law.  The 
best approach would be for the HRC to consider relevant 
international instruments explicitly in its analysis, while limiting 
itself to finding violations of the Civil and Political Covenant. 
Creating a separate body to address alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law presents a host of practical 
problems, ranging from designing a new international body to 
gaining international acceptance.182  Even if such a body were 
successfully created, there would likely be a large amount of 
substantive overlap between it and already existing institutions 
like the HRC and the International Criminal Court.  Depending 
 
182 Perhaps the most obvious obstacle to the creation of a separate body is the 
likely paucity of political will.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make 
International Environmental Law, 86 AM J. INT’L L. 259, 282 (1992) (noting “a broad 
consensus among governments that the creation of new institutions should be 
avoided when possible”).  Great power antinomy may further undermine the 
efficacy of such a body.  See, e.g., Salvatore Zappalà, The Reaction of the US to the 
Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: Comments on UN SC Resolution 1422 (2002) and 
Article 98 Agreements, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 114, 133 (2003) (arguing that Article 98 
agreements as proposed by the United States are incompatible with the Rome 
Statute). 
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upon the composition of the body, moreover, it may take 
substantial time to develop expertise.183  Nonetheless, an 
international body designed to consider violations of international 
humanitarian law would provide explicit analysis and precedent 
and could be comprised of members with the appropriate 
expertise.  Ultimately, however, such an approach would be 
complicated to achieve and likely redundant in its final product.  
Creating a new international body, therefore, does not present the 
most feasible or effective way to address interpretations of 
international humanitarian law. 
The alternative is to require the HRC to modify its approach 
when addressing issues of international humanitarian law.  The 
basic output required would be for the Committee to state when an 
issue presents a violation of the Geneva Conventions.  There are 
several arguments in favor of and in opposition to such an 
approach. 
A simple argument in favor of having the Committee explicitly 
consider international humanitarian law is that it already does so.  
According to its Concluding Observations, the Covenant already 
offers many of the same protections as the Geneva Conventions 
and international humanitarian law.  Consequently, in its 
Decisions and Views, the Committee would only need to take a 
few sentences to relate violations of the Covenant explicitly to 
international humanitarian law, which it already does in its 
Concluding Observations.  Moreover, since such violations only 
occur in situations of armed conflict, the Committee would only 
have to perform the additional analysis in the uncommon situation 
of a state of emergency or armed conflict.  Additionally, authors 
and State parties have appeared eager to support their positions by 
reference to international instruments, which they would likely put 
before the Committee.  Similarly, the Committee considers itself 
 
183 A potent criticism of the application of humanitarian law by human rights 
bodies is that such bodies often lack expertise in the law of war.  The HRC, 
however, contains a greater percentage of members with expertise in 
humanitarian law than do other human rights bodies.  Compare Meron, supra note 
117, at 247 (citing the lack of expertise in “the law of war” and the tendency of 
such bodies to “reach conclusions that humanitarian law experts find 
problematic”), with Christine Byron, A Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of 
International Humanitarian Law by Human Rights Bodies, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 882 
(2007) (noting that fifty percent of the HRC’s experts have some expertise in 
humanitarian law, as compared to between fourteen and twenty-eight percent 
and sixteen percent of the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, respectively). 
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competent to consider other instruments and, on several occasions, 
explicitly has incorporated other standards to support a finding of 
a violation.  By finding a violation of the Civil and Political 
Covenant through a violation of another international standard, 
the Committee is effectively finding a violation of the other 
international instrument. 
The immediate counter-argument to having the Committee 
explicitly find violations of international humanitarian law in its 
Decisions and Views is that the Optional Protocol to the Civil and 
Political Covenant limits the Committee to considering violations 
of the Civil and Political Covenant.  Therefore, the Committee has 
no mandate or authority to pronounce state violations of 
international humanitarian law.  Another counter-argument is that 
there is no need for the Committee to address international 
humanitarian law explicitly: since the Committee has declared that 
the Covenant protects many of the same rights as international 
humanitarian law and applies regardless of the situation, the 
Committee already addresses any potential violation of 
international humanitarian law through the Civil and Political 
Covenant.  A further argument is that the Committee already has 
built up its own jurisprudence based on the Civil and Political 
Covenant, and that suddenly changing its methodology and 
approach could call into question the viability of its previous 
jurisprudence.  There is also the limitation that only individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of states party to the Optional Protocol 
could raise such claims, so the Committee would be effectively 
precluded from considering alleged violations of international 
humanitarian law occurring in nonparty states.  This problem, 
however, is no different from what would occur with attempting to 
create a separate body to consider violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
Reducing the arguments for and against, the Committee would 
not have to perform substantially more work or analysis to address 
international humanitarian law in its Decisions and Views, but 
under the Optional Protocol cannot pronounce a violation of 
another international instrument. 
The best the HRC could do under its current mandate would 
be to utilize relevant international instruments explicitly in its 
analysis of alleged Covenant violations.  By incorporating other 
international instruments into its analysis, the Committee could 
still comply with the Optional Protocol so long as the individual 
claimed a violation of a Covenant right.  Because the Civil and 
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Political Covenant ostensibly offers many of the same protections 
as international humanitarian law, an individual could allege a 
violation of the Covenant and cite the Geneva Conventions in 
support.  The Committee could still find a violation of only the 
Covenant, but if it explicitly incorporated the Geneva Conventions 
into its analysis, it might actually create some precedent for 
international humanitarian law and interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
Such an approach would encourage individuals to support 
their claims with relevant international humanitarian standards, 
enable the HRC to provide analysis of those standards, and take a 
needed further step toward harmonizing the substance of human 
rights and humanitarian law.  Even though the ultimate findings 
would be in terms of Covenant provisions, the Committee’s 
analysis could be informative and precedential. 
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